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TRIBAL COURTS AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
Kevin K. Washburnt

INTRODUCTION

Because of their unique relationship to the federal government, and
because of the peculiar federal criminal justice regime that applies in Indian
country, American Indians and tribal governments are affected by the
federal sentencing guidelines perhaps more profoundly than any other
distinct group in America. Unlike most Americans, who face federal
prosecution only for offenses that have a particular federal nexus, such as
narcotics, racketeering or terrorism, American Indians in Indian country are
subject to federal prosecution for numerous felonies, including homicide,
larceny, burglary, and rape, which would not rise to the level of federal
prosecution outside of Indian country. Federal prosecution and sentencing
constitute an important part of the framework of the community in Indian
country, a place where crime rates tend to be high and law enforcement
tends to be uneven.
Since their adoption in 1987, the United States Sentencing Guidelines
have drawn criticism from a wide variety of perspectives. Scholars and
federal judges alike have raised practical complaints, arguing that the
guidelines unduly restrict judicial discretion and produce sentences that do
Scholars of the
not adequately account for individual circumstances.'
t
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See, e.g., Kevin Reitz, The Disassembly andReassembly of U.S. SentencingPractices,
in SENTENCING AND SANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 222, 250-51 (Michael Tonry &
Richard S. Frase, Eds., 2001); -KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 195-96 & n.12 (1998); Michael Tonry, The
Failure of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 131 (1993);
1.
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criminal justice system have raised structural critiques, arguing that the
contraction of judicial sentencing discretion simultaneously expanded the
authority of prosecutors, 2 and that the guidelines have undermined the
3
traditional role of defense counsel in advocating zealously for their clients.
Scholars have also attacked the guidelines from a critical race perspective,
arguing that the guidelines produce disparately long sentences for AfricanAmericans 4 and Hispanics, 5 and from a feminist perspective, attacking them
as being constructed for males and unfair for females. 6 Finally, many
commentators have argued that the guidelines simply are too harsh,
resulting in unduly long sentences. 7 Despite the range of critical review,
Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992).
2.
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey, or Judge, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 723
(1993); see also Reitz, supra note 1, at 250-56 (collecting critiques of various scholars).
3.
See Margaret Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal
Criminal Courts: An Empirical Study on the Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming March 2004) (noting that zealous
advocacy such as filing a suppression motion may cause a defendant to forego credit for
acceptance of responsibility or putting a defendant on the witness stand, if he is not believed,
may result in an increased sentence for obstruction ofjustice).
4.
See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier et al., The Interaction of Race, Gender, and Age in
CriminalSentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36 CRIMINOLOGY
763 (1998) (using Pennsylvania data from 1989-92, to examine prison sentences for young
black males versus other race, age and gender groups).
5.
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. et al., Latinos and the CriminalJustice System: A View from
Both Sides of the Bar, I HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1994) (symposium issue containing articles
criticizing the guidelines from the perspective of the interests of Hispanic Americans and other
minority groups).
6.
See, e.g., Amy Farrell, Distinguishing Among the "Unhappys": The Influence of
Cultural Gender Norms on Judicial Decisions to Grant Family Ties Departures, 13 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 268 (2001); Ilene H. Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a
Structured Sentencing System: Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female
Offenders Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
181 (1994); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and
Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,20
PEPP. L. REV. 905 (1993); Symposium, Gender and Sentencing, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 132
(1995) (presenting ten articles examining problems arising for woman prisoners because the
federal sentencing guidelines are based on the image of the male offender); Harvey Wallace &
Shanda Wedlock, FederalSentencing Guidelines and Gender Issues: ParentalResponsibilities,
Pregnancyand Domestic Violence, 2 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 395 (1994) (noting that the attempt to
reduce disparity and individualized sentencing has produced drawbacks for women and
suggesting amendments to the guidelines that would allow judicial discretion for downward
departures in the cases of battered women, primary child caretaker responsibilities, and
pregnancy).
7.
Between 1987 and 1997, the federal imprisonment rate increased by 119%, a 25%
greater surge than the imprisonment rates for the nation as a whole during the same time period.
MICHAEL TONRY, PENAL REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 36-37 (2001) (also noting that

"federal district court judges complain regularly that the guidelines (or Congress's mandatory
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in the important
however, few commentators have analyzed the guidelines
8
country.
Indian
in
justice
criminal
context of federal
In our federalist system, the United States has a particular, but limited,
role in criminal justice; state governments handle most of the routine
offenses. 9 In Indian country, our governmental structure provides a similar
but with two
duality between the federal and tribal governments,
substantial differences. First, although the United States theoretically
shares criminal jurisdiction with tribal governments, federal jurisdiction in
Indian country is far more pervasive because federal law has largely ousted
tribal jurisdiction for all felony offenses. Second, unlike state courts, whose
convictions and sentences are given due respect by the United States
minimums, or both) force them to impose heavier sentences than they would otherwise have
chosen"). Using data from the United States Department of Justice, some commentators have
explained that "[o]ffenders sentenced under the federal sentencing guidelines are more likely to
go to prison and to stay there longer than were offenders sentenced for crimes committed before
the guidelines took effect in November 1987." NICHOLAS N. KJTTRIE ET AL., SENTENCING,
SANCTIONS AND CORRECTIONS 261 (2d ed. 2002) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FEDERAL PRISON
TERMS INCREASING UNDER SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1992)).

The federal Indian country criminal justice regime is generally codified at 18 U.S.C.
8.
§§ 1151-1153 (2001). For commentary describing and critiquing the current state of sentencing
for Indian country offenses, see Charles B. Kommann, Injustices: Applying the Sentencing
Guidelines and Other Federal Mandates in Indian Country, 13 FED. SENTENCING REP. 71
(2000) (recounting a variety of ways in which the sentencing guidelines and federal criminal
laws have perverse impacts in Indian country cases); Jon M. Sands, Indian Crimes and Federal
Courts, 11 FED. SENTENCING REP. 153 (1998) (surveying the federal Indian country criminal
laws and encouraging sentencing departures based on the "uniqueness of Indian culture"); and
Jon M. Sands, Departure Reform and Indian Crimes, Reading the Commission's Staff Paper
with "Reservations," 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 1 (1996) (criticizing the Commission for failing
to consider Indian defendants in a policy paper regarding departure from guidelines sentences
and encouraging adoption of a departure provision, for downward departures only, based on
"dependent sovereign nation status").
9.
As a statement of the current state of affairs, this statement is not particularly
controversial. However, following United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), there has been
a greater debate raging as to legitimate scope and authority of the federal government to address
crimes that otherwise might be considered "routine." In other words, the statement in the text
may not be true not just as an empirical matter, but also as a legal conclusion. See generally
Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 Mo. L. REV. 389 (2003). But see Richard W.
Garnett, The New Federalism,the Spending Power and FederalCriminal Law, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 34-39 (2003) (arguing that the Commerce Clause is only one source of federal power
and that other sources may offer authority over criminal offenses).
10. See Robert N. Clinton, CriminalJurisdictionOver Indian Lands, A Journey Through a
JurisdictionalMaze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 505-07, 522-45, 557-65 (1976); Robert N. Clinton,
Development of CriminalJurisdictionover Indian Lands: The HistoricalPerspective, 17 ARIZ.
L. REV. 951, 953-54 (1975); see also Richard W. Garnett, Once More into the Maze: United
States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian
Country, 72 N.D. L. REV. 433 (1996) (describing the complex nature of tribal and federal
government criminal jurisdiction, based on sources such as the U.S. Constitution, Indian
General Crimes Act, the Major Crimes Act and "generally applicable" federal criminal laws).

406

ARIZONA STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

Sentencing Commission ("Commission") in sentencing for subsequent
federal offenses, past offenses adjudicated by tribal courts are ignored in the
federal sentencing process.
In light of the overwhelming acceptance of the norm of tribal selfgovernance in federal Indian policy, the Commission's decision not to
credit the legitimate work of tribal courts in adjudicating misdemeanor
sentences is surprising. This article critically evaluates this peculiar and
unexplained policy. Part I describes the current federal policy toward tribal
governments with particular emphasis on tribal courts and explains the role
of tribal courts in the unique federal criminal justice regime that governs
Indian country. Part II describes the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with
particular attention to the provisions on criminal history. Part II also
evaluates the Commission's current position that tribal courts ought to be
treated like foreign courts rather than state courts for purposes of criminal
history calculations. Part III evaluates the Commission's treatment of tribal
courts in light of the broader context of federal Indian policy and the actions
of federal judges, state courts, and legislatures. Part III also explains some
of the inconsistency of the current stance toward tribal courts with regard to
federal sentencing policy and explains the consequences of this policy for
tribal courts and Indian communities. Part IV suggests reforms to the
Commission's policy on tribal courts that would position the Commission
more in line with the mainstream of federal Indian policy and ensure that
tribal court adjudications and sentences are accorded whatever respect they
are due.
I. THE STATUS OF TRIBAL COURTS IN FEDERAL LAW AND POLICY AND IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Although tribal governments have existed in one form or another for
centuries, they evolved dramatically in the latter half of the twentieth
century. To a significant degree, this development can be attributed to the
re-emergence of an ally once lost. In the last thirty years, the United States
has forsaken its on-again, off-again hostility toward Indian tribes and has
broadly and comprehensively embraced a new official policy that favors
federal support of tribal self-governance. With the broad support of the
United States government, tribal governments have thrived.
The White House took the lead in supporting tribal governments. Since
Richard Nixon first outlined a detailed policy in favor of tribal selfdetermination in 1970, virtually every American president has voiced strong
support for the notion that tribal governments should be encouraged,
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supported and even honored by the federal government.1 1 In keeping with
presidential directives, the United States Department of Justice has an
official policy on "Indian Sovereignty and Government-to-Government
Relations with Indian Tribes" indicating that "[t]he Department is
committed to strengthening and assisting Indian tribal governments in their
development and to promoting [tribal] self-governance.' ' 2 13 Numerous
suit.
executive branch and independent agencies have followed
Though the executive branch led the way, Congress adopted the tribal
self-determination policy as its own in the very beginning and has worked
aggressively to insure that the policy is reflected in the laws of the United
States. Congress has created or amended programs throughout the federal
government to accommodate and embrace tribal self-determination,
at the Departments of
including the full range of so-called Indian programs
14
the Interior and Health and Human Services.

11. See generally President Clinton's Memorandum of Government-to-Government
Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22951 (Apr. 29, 1994)
(stating that "I am strongly committed to building a more effective day-to-day working
relationship reflecting respect for the rights of self-government due the sovereign tribal
governments"); President George Bush's Statement Reaffirming the Government-toGovernment Relationship Between the Federal Government and Indian Tribal Governments, 1
PUB. PAPERS 662 (1991) (noting the "administration's policy of fostering tribal self-government
and self-determination."); President Reagan's Statement on Indian Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 96
(1983) (asserting that "[t]his administration believes that responsibilities and resources should
be restored to the governments which are closest to the people served. This philosophy applies
not only to State and local governments but also to federally recognized American Indian Tribes
on a government-to-government basis and to pursue the policy of self-government for Indian
tribes"); President Nixon's Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS
564 (1970) (stating that "[s]elf-determination among the Indian people can and must be
encouraged").
12. Department of Justice Policy on Indian Sovereignty and Government-to-Government
Relations with Indian Tribes (Jun. 1, 1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/otj/sovtrb.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
13. Though there are far too many to list here, for a sense of the range, consider: U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., INDIAN RESERVATIONS ROADS PROGRAM, TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES (1999); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 5-

14.310(D) (2001) (requiring consultation with tribes regarding civil litigation brought on behalf
of tribes under the federal trust responsibility); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, AMERICAN INDIAN
POLICY (2000) (requiring consultation on energy projects); FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY,
FINAL AGENCY POLICY ON GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH AMERICAN INDIAN

AND ALASKA NATIVE GOVERNMENTS (1998) (requiring consultation with tribes on emergency
management actions).
14. See Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450a-b (2000); see also
Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-84, 105 Stat. 1278
(2000) (amending portions of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n).
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Congress has not, however, limited the tribal self-determination policy to
traditional areas of Indian policy; it has amended a range of general federal
programs and statutes affecting Indians that are not generally conceived as
"Indian programs," particularly in the area of environmental, natural
resources and cultural resources laws. 15 To provide but one example, the
Environmental Protection Agency is6 literally required to treat Indian tribes
"as states" for a range of functions.'
Congress has specifically singled out tribal courts and has repeatedly
17
expressed its confidence in, and support of, these growing institutions.
Among other developments, Congress has required all courts in the United
States to grant full faith and credit to certain kinds of tribal court

judgments. 18

Nowhere is the federal government's policy in favor of tribal selfdetermination more visible than in the federal courts. In 1985, in National
Farmers Union Insurance Cos. of Indians v. Crow Tribe,19 the United
States Supreme Court adopted a rule requiring exhaustion of tribal court
review of federal questions regarding the scope of tribal jurisdiction,
making tribal courts, if not masters of their own domains then, at least,
gatekeepers to the federal courts for questions of their own jurisdiction
15. See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(2) (2000);
Archeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470cc (2000); Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (2000).
16. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2) (2000); Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §
1377(e) (2000); see also Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-ll(b)(1) (2000);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9626(a) (2000) (also called CERCLA or the Superfund law); Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(13) (2000).
17. In 1991, an independent federal commission, the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, urged Congress to increase the funding of tribal courts in amounts equal to the funding
provided to state courts. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS: THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
72-73 (1991). In 1993, Congress responded by enacting the Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25
U.S.C. § 3601(5) (2000) (indicating that "tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal
governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public health and safety and the
political integrity of tribal governments"). Congress also established an Office of Tribal Justice
Support within the Bureau of Indian Affairs and authorized annual appropriations up to $50
million for assistance to tribal courts. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3611-14, 3621b (2000). Seven years later,
in 2000, Congress enacted the Indian Tribal Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act, 25
U.S.C. § 3651 (2000) (finding that "tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal
governments and serve as important forums for ensuring the health and safety and the political
integrity of tribal governments").
While Congress has been rather long on policy
pronouncements, and short on actual appropriations, it has strongly expressed the view that
tribal courts are worthy of respect and encouragement.
18. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2000); see also Indian
Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(d) (2000).
19. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
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under federal law. The Court took this action on its own initiative as a
matter of federal common law and without any express legislative direction
by Congress, though the Court noted, "Our cases have often recognized that
Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government and
self-determination. ' 2° Lest that decision be thought a fleeting fancy, the
Court reaffirmed this approach two years later and extended the doctrine of
tribal court exhaustion to diversity cases brought to the federal courts. 21
In light of these actions, and the implementation of similar approaches in
the lower federal courts, tribal courts have become an integral part of the
fabric of our nation's judicial system.22 That is not to say that the tribal
court jurisdiction is exceedingly broad. In cases such as Strate v. A-]
Contractors23and Nevada v. Hicks, 24 in which the issue involved on tribal
court jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Supreme Court has indicated that it
will require exhaustion of tribal court consideration of its own jurisdiction
only where the tribal court's jurisdiction is relatively clear or at least likely.
In civil matters, and to a much greater degree in criminal matters, tribal
courts speak with the clearest authority when they are addressing issues that
affect only tribal members, or that at least have a very strong and direct
effect on tribal members. 25 Indeed, tribal courts can truly be characterized
as courts of general jurisdiction only when they are dealing with purely
internal matters, such as matters between tribal members.26 Within their
area of competent jurisdiction, however, federal law has insured that tribal

20. Id. at 856.
21. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
22. See Penn v. United States, 335 F.3d 786, 789-90 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that a tribal
court judge is entitled to the same absolute judicial immunity that shields federal and state court
judges); Gaming World Int'l Ltd. v. White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians, 317 F.3d 840,
849-52 (8th Cir. 2003); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1498, 1507-09 (10th Cir. 1997)
(affirming stay of federal court proceedings to allow tribal court to determine its own
jurisdiction in a case involving a nuclear tort claim under the Price Anderson Act); Pittsburg &
Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531, 1542, 1546 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing
district court's failure to abstain in favor of a tribal court proceeding in a case involving the
right of a tribe to tax mining activities). Several federal courts have also reached out to tribal
courts in a more informal manner. Indeed, the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, and even many

state courts, have worked cooperatively with tribal courts to increase understanding. See, e.g.,
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON TRIBAL
COURTS (Aug. 20, 1997).

23. 520 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1997).
24. 533 U.S. 353, 357-59 (2001).
25. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding tribe had jurisdiction over
non-Indian operating a general store on tribal land).
26. Cf.Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 544-45 (1981) (holding a tribe generally
has no inherent jurisdiction over non-member land within tribal land).
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court authority27 has remained broad, at least if tribal lawmakers have seen fit
to make it so.
Tribal courts have an even more definitive role in the area of criminal
justice. Though the federal Indian country criminal justice regime has been
described as complex, 28 the place and authority of tribal courts within that
regime is clear. Even on Indian reservations, tribal courts do not possess
jurisdiction over non-Indians, 29 but tribal courts do possess jurisdiction over
crimes committed by tribal members30 and other Indians. 3 1 Though tribal
court jurisdiction over Indians is certain, it is also substantively limited; it
extends only to misdemeanors. 32 For what is likely the largest category of

27. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 402 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that "the question whether
tribal courts are courts of general jurisdiction is fundamentally one of tribal law").
28. See generally Clinton, Development of CriminalJurisdictionover Indian Lands, supra
note 10.
29. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 201-06 (1978).
30. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
31. The source, but not the existence, of tribal court jurisdiction over non-member Indians
is uncertain at this time. Congress believes tribal authority over non-member Indians to be
inherent within the tribes. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000). The Supreme Court has given
some indication that it believes that such authority is not inherent. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,
684-88 (1990). Lower courts have wrestled with the question as to whether it is inherent or
congressionally-delegated, with the Ninth Circuit holding that tribal authority is inherent and the
Eighth Circuit holding that tribal authority was delegated by Congress. Compare United States
v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 666-71 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), with United States v. Lara, 324 F.3d
635, 637-40 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted (Sept. 30, 2003). See also United States v.
Weaselhead, 156 F.3d 818, 821-24 (8th Cir. 1998). By the time this article is published, the
Supreme Court will likely have resolved this issue in the Lara case.
32. Some would disagree with the characterization of tribal criminal jurisdiction as limited
to misdemeanors by noting that tribes may, for example, prosecute even serious offenses such
as murder. Under the most recent amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§
1301-03 (2000), tribal criminal court sentences are limited to no more than one year of
imprisonment and a fine of no more than $5000. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7), amended by Pub. L. No.
99-570, Tit. IV, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). Thus, although a tribe may indeed have the
authority to prosecute one of its members for murder, federal law limits the tribal sentence to
one year. § 1302(7); Clinton, Development of CriminalJurisdiction over Indian Lands, supra
note 10, at 971 (characterizing the Indian Civil Rights Act as limiting tribal jurisdiction and
noting that when it was originally passed, one provision, "while not expressly limiting the
crimes cognizable in tribal courts, limited the punishments which the tribal courts could impose
to six months' imprisonment or a $500 fine"). Because federal law classifies crimes by
reference to the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the crime, and explicitly defines
a crime punishable by one year or less of imprisonment as a misdemeanor (see 18 U.S.C. §
3559(a)(6)-(9) (2000)), then federal law would characterize crimes over which tribal courts
exercise jurisdiction as misdemeanors. Under this scheme, no tribal offense could meet the
federal definition of "felony." See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(o)
(2002) ("'felony offense' means any federal, state, or local offense punishable by death or a
term of imprisonment exceeding one year, regardless of the actual sentence imposed"). Thus, it
is correct as a matter of federal law to say that tribal court jurisdiction is limited to
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crime in Indian country, misdemeanor offenses committed by one Indian

against another, federal or state courts generally lack jurisdiction over such
offenses.3433 Tribal court jurisdiction is therefore generally exclusive in this
respect.
Felony offenses by Indians against Indians, on the other hand, are
handled exclusively by the United States. A short list of approximately
twenty such offenses, characterized in federal law as the "major crimes,"
are prosecuted exclusively by federal prosecutors in federal courts. 3 5 This

jurisdictional scheme creates what is, in effect, a partnership between
federal courts and tribal courts in Indian country. Federal courts handle the
major crimes (felonies) and the tribal courts must handle all other offenses
(misdemeanors) .36
The important and well-defined role of tribal courts in the Indian country
criminal justice scheme bears emphasis. Tribal courts have long exercised
criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction. The fact that Congress has left the

tribes with exclusive jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses is evidence
that it expects tribal courts to exercise misdemeanor jurisdiction. Thus, the

United States presumes that tribal courts exist and are competent to
prosecute misdemeanors-this presumption is a key component of the

misdemeanors (though this conclusion leads to the surprising statement that, when prosecuted
by an Indian tribe in Indian country, murder is a misdemeanor).
33. Tribal court jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses committed by Indians against
non-Indians is also exclusive, but only if it is exercised. See General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1152 (2000) (giving the United States jurisdiction over certain crimes involving Indians, but
excepting those for which an Indian tribe has already punished the defendant).
34. The United States has jurisdiction over only one misdemeanor offense involving
Indians. Under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000), the United States possesses
jurisdiction over assault against an individual who has not attained the age of sixteen years, 18
U.S.C. § 113(a)(5) (2000), an offense defined as a Class A misdemeanor in the United States
Code. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (providing for federal prosecution of murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping, maiming, sex abuse, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a
dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, an assault against an individual
who has not attained the age of sixteen years, arson, burglary, robbery, and felony larceny).
Note that the only misdemeanor within the Major Crimes Act is assault against an individual
who has not attained the age of sixteen years.
36. The United States Department of Justice takes the position that the United States may
also prosecute any other federal criminal offense in which situs is not an element of the offense,
such as narcotics offenses. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, CRIMINAL RESOURCE
MANUAL
678,
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading_room/usam/title9/crm00678.htm
(last visited
Feb. 9, 2004).
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federal criminal justice regime in Indian country. 37 If tribal prosecutors and

tribal courts do not act, these offenses will go unpunished. 38
To provide an example of how the federal-tribal criminal justice system
functions in practice, consider the Navajo Nation. The Navajo Nation
courts heard 27,602 criminal cases in a recent twelve-month period. 39 The
United States prosecutes far fewer, but much more serious, offenses. In
2003, the United States Attorney's Office in Arizona prosecuted 487 cases

that arose on the Navajo Nation, of which 169 were sex offenses, 118 were
aggravated assaults (such as assault with a weapon, with the intent to
commit murder, or assault resulting in serious bodily injury), and 98 were
In sheer numbers, this federal-tribal criminal justice
homicides. 40
partnership, thus, is somewhat one sided with the tribal courts handling the

vast majority of the cases. While it is difficult to estimate the significance
of the misdemeanor work performed by the tribal courts, the evidence might
lead one to conclude that the role of tribal courts is exceedingly important.

Without active tribal courts, a large number of misdemeanor offenses would
go unpunished, creating prosecution-free zones for misdemeanors.
Congress indicated in 2000 that "the rate of violent crime committed in
Indian country is approximately twice the rate of violent crime committed

37. A handful of Indian tribes lacking tribal courts, primarily in Oklahoma, have courts
authorized by Congress and organized by the Department of the Interior called "Courts of
Indian Offenses" to hear civil and misdemeanor cases. These federal administrative courts exist
to insure that reservations without tribal courts are provided an alternative forum for hearing
certain civil and criminal disputes. Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No Man's Land, 36
GA. L. REV. 895, 965-66 (2002). For a complete listing of the current courts of Indian offenses,
see 25 C.F.R. § 11.100(a) (2003).
38. See Clinton, JurisdictionalMaze, supra note 10; Clinton, Development of Criminal
Jurisdiction over Indian Lands, supra note 10; Tim Vollman, CriminalJurisdictionin Indian
Country: Tribal Sovereignty & Defendants Rights in Conflict, 22 KAN. L. REV. 387, 390 (1974).
39. See Russell Means v. Dist. Ct.-Chinle Judicial District, 26 INDIAN L. REP. 6083, 6084
(Navajo 1999). The Navajo Nation courts adjudicated those cases during its fiscal year 1998,
which runs the same as the federal fiscal year, October through September. Id. Driving while
intoxicated and crimes against persons (such as assault and battery) together constituted over
12,000 cases and forty-four percent of the caseload. Id. The next largest categories were
offenses against the family, intoxicating liquor offenses and offenses against public order, each
of which accounted for more than 2000 cases and around eight percent of the remaining
caseload. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court characterized this information as evidence that
tribal courts are "addressing the serious criminal and social problems of drunk driving, assaults
and batteries (including aggravated assault and battery with deadly weapons), sex offenses
against children, disorderly conduct, and public intoxication." Id
40. United States Attorney, District of Arizona, Indian Country Report 2003, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/indrpt03.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). The Navajo Nation, an
Indian reservation frequently likened in geographical size to the state of West Virginia, also
extends into New Mexico and Utah. The largest portion of the reservation lies within Arizona.
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in the United States as a whole[.] ' '4' The Department of Justice found that
Native Americans experience violent crime at the rate of about one violent
crime victim in every eight residents. This compares to a rate of one in

sixteen for African Americans and one in twenty for whites.42 In such a
high crime environment, many would agree that one of the most important
components of crime control is insuring that misdemeanor offenses are
addressed.43

In summary, as Congress and the Supreme Court have expressed in
federal statutory and common law, and as Justice O'Connor has explained,
tribal courts "have an increasingly important role to play in the
administration of the laws of our nation.
With this background, let us
turn to the role of tribal courts in the federal sentencing regime.
II. THE STATUS OF TRIBAL COURTS IN FEDERAL SENTENCING

A. The Development of the Sentencing Guidelines
In federal courts, sentencing proceeds in accordance with sentencing
guidelines authorized by Congress in 1984. 45 When Congress sought the
creation of the guidelines, it delegated to the United States Sentencing

Commission ("Commission") the important (and exceedingly difficult)
responsibility of formulating actual guidelines.4 6 In the guidelines, which
the Commission first issued in 1987 and has amended annually, the
41.
42.

25 U.S.C. § 3651(3).
LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Feb. 1999); see also
Contemporary Tribal Governments: Hearing on Impact of Supreme Court Rulings on Law
Enforcement in Indian Country Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. 10-12
(2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of U.S. Attorney Thomas Heffelfinger and statement of
Tracey Toulou, Director of Tribal Justice).
43. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing,90
CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1527-30 (2002). Even those who are critical of "order-maintenance"
policing and the broken windows approach would likely concede, for example, that more
serious misdemeanors, such as assault, driving while intoxicated and domestic violence, ought
to be addressed routinely. Cf BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE
PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (Harvard 2001).
44. Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts,
33 TULSA L.J. 1, 6 (1997).
45. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 28
U.S.C. § 994(a) (2000).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2000). In Mistretta, the Supreme Court upheld this delegation of
authority over the lone dissent of Justice Scalia. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989).
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Commission attempted to provide for a variety of differing sentencing
goals, not all of which are necessarily consistent with one another. The
Sentencing Reform Act directed the Commission to create sentences that
"reflect the seriousness of the offense," "promote respect for the law," and
"provide just punishment." 47 In addition, the sentences were supposed to
"afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct," "protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant"
and "provide the defendant with needed...
48
treatment.,
correctional
To give effect to these goals, the Commission determined that the length
of a defendant's sentence should be based on two primary determinants: the
seriousness of the offense and the seriousness of the offender's past
criminal record. In the table or grid formulated by the Commission to
activate this approach, the seriousness of the instant offense constitutes the
vertical axis and the defendant's past criminal record constitutes the
horizontal axis. By making criminal history one of only two primary
determinants, the Commission gave enormous weight to the past criminal
conduct of a defendant.
This approach is justified on the basis of the utilitarian theory that an
offender's criminal history is a good predictor of the risk that he will
commit a crime in the future.4 9 Thus, using criminal history as a principal
basis for sentencing was intended to assure that a person with a long
criminal history, who is presumably likely to re-offend, will remain5 in
prison longer and, thus, be incapacitated from committing further crime. 0
Heavily weighting criminal history can also be justified from a
retribution or "just desert" rationale on the theory that the person with a
criminal history is more culpable than a person with a lesser criminal
history. 5 1 This theory is partially justified by "notice;" that is, a person who
commits another criminal act is far more likely to have a sense of the
consequences of the criminal act than a first-time offender might have. It
might also be justified on the basis of character of the offender. One who
has committed many previous offenses may be demonstrating his true
criminal character; for the person who has no criminal history, the offense
52
may simply represent a single and aberrational failure of moral intuition.

47. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2000).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D).
49. See Aaron Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The PhilosophicalPremises of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 591-92 (2003).
50. Id. at 593-95.
51. Id. at 595-98.
52. Id. at 596-603.
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After determining that the defendant's past criminal record would
constitute one of the two principal determinants of the length of a sentence,
the Commission then had to determine which portions of the defendant's
past criminal history to count and which to exclude. Ultimately, the
Commission decided to exclude certain minor offenses, such as disorderly
conduct, trespassing and public intoxication, 53 from consideration in
criminal history. The Commission also excluded from consideration
sentences that have grown stale with the passage of time, including
sentences that were served fifteen years prior to the instant offense.5 4 As to
most other offenses, the Commission counts the offense and gives it a value
based on the length of sentence that accompanied the conviction. 55 In other
words, the Commission determines the severity of the past offense based
not on the crime of conviction, but on the length of the sentence received.
Such an approach gives enormous weight to the prior court's estimate of
the seriousness of the offense. For an offense such as assault, a court in
Texas may, for example, routinely render a much greater sentence than a
court in Minnesota. By measuring criminal history based on the length of
each of the prior sentences, rather than on the objective facts of the
offenses, the guidelines methodology requires the conclusion that an assault
conviction in, in this example, Texas, which is punished more severely, is
more serious as a matter of criminal history than the same conviction in
Minnesota, where the sentence is likely to be less severe. This approach
thus gives enormous respect to the courts where the past convictions
occurred and, by inference, to the communities who are expressing their
subjective moral judgments as to those crimes through their criminal justice
processes. In using an objective approach based on the length of sentence,
the Commission therefore credited the subjective different conclusions of
each community as to the seriousness of past offenses.
Given the importance of the community in determination of criminal
history, the Commission also had to determine whether sentences from
courts outside the federal system, including foreign courts, tribal courts, and
state courts (including county and municipal courts), should be included in
a defendant's criminal history. On this issue, the Commission initially took
an inclusive approach. In its preliminary draft of the guidelines, the
Commission indicated that sentences from tribal courts would be given the
same weight as those issued by state and federal courts.5 6 The Commission
53. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(c)(1-2) (2002).
54. Id. at § 4A1.2(e).
55. Id.at§4Al.1.
56. See Notice of Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts,
51 Fed. Reg. 35080, 35118 (Oct. 1, 1986).
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indicated that it would count sentences from foreign courts as long as the
foreign conviction reflected conduct that would also be considered criminal
if it occurred in the United States.57
This inclusive approach was consistent with the Commission's
philosophy that criminal history was an important factor in determining
culpability and that individuals with similar levels of culpability should
receive similar sentences, thus reducing unwarranted disparity in
sentencing. Indeed, if the purpose of measuring criminal history is to insure
that offenders with similar records are treated similarly, and therefore,
fairly, defendants with lengthy criminal histories should be treated similarly
no matter where the original conviction was adjudicated. In keeping with
its inclusive approach, the Commission also chose to count convictions and
sentences from state courts at all levels, failing to make any relevant
distinctions between federal, state, county or municipal courts.
In the final draft of the guidelines, however, the Commission abruptly
changed course. Although it included in the criminal history calculation
sentences from all levels of state courts, 58 the Commission chose a different
Without
path for sentences from tribal courts or foreign courts.
59
courts
tribal
from
sentences
that
determined
Commission
the
explanation,
or foreign courts should be considered only in extraordinary circumstances.
Under the guidelines as enacted, tribal and foreign court sentences are not
routinely counted in criminal history computations, 60 but constitute a
"favored" basis for upward departure. 6' Sentences from tribal courts and
foreign courts may be used only if the defendant's criminal history score
fails to reflect adequately the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal
57. Id.
58. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL § 4A1.2(c)(1) (noting that local ordinance
violations are counted if they are also criminal offenses under state law) and § 4A1.2,
application n. 12.
59. The Commission has apparently never explained this abrupt change in course and its
final decision as to how to consider tribal court sentences. In discussing the matter with persons
who were aware of Commission deliberation during or soon after adoption of the final
guidelines, I am told that the concern for using tribal court judgments was based on a lack of
trust of tribal court procedural protections. Conversations and correspondence with Magdeline
E. Jensen, Chief Federal Probation Officer (Arizona) (October 2, 2002) and Assistant Federal
Public Defender Jon M. Sands (Arizona) (September 25, 2002) (on file with author). I am
grateful to them for their assistance on understanding this issue. The legitimacy of such
concerns will be discussed in greater detail below.
60.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(i) (stating that "[s]entences resulting

from tribal court convictions are not counted, but may be considered under § 4A1.3 (Adequacy
of Criminal History Category)"); see also id. § 4A1.2(h) (stating that "[s]entences resulting
from foreign convictions are not counted, but may be considered under § 4A1.3 (Adequacy of
Criminal History Category)").
61. See id. § 4A1.3(a); United States v. Drapeau, 110 F.3d 618, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1997).
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history and the sentencing judge is willing to use such records as a basis for
increasing the defendant's criminal history score above the level set by the
guideline calculation. 62 Such upward departures are exceedingly rare,
63
occurring in fewer than one percent of federal sentences.
In the absence of any explanation, it is not entirely clear why the
Commission chose such an approach for tribal sentences. In the series of
nationwide hearings that the Commission held in 1986 and 1987 while it
was developing the guidelines, few witnesses addressed tribal issues. Little
consensus appears from the testimony of the witnesses at such hearings.
Apparently the only tribal representative to testify in any of the hearings
was an Assistant Attorney General of the Navajo Nation. She criticized
federal prosecutors, testifying that "federal prosecution has been, in the eyes
of most Indian tribes,... woefully lacking" 64 and noting that "crimes often

go unpunished and felony declinations are extremely high. 6 5 She testified
as to her experience that defendants are prosecuted tribally in many cases
because the federal government often fails to prosecute. To make this
point, she indicated that a homicide case declined by the United States
Attorney's Office might be pursued by the tribal prosecutors so that the
criminal offense would not fall through the cracks and go unpunished.66
She specifically asked the Commission to recognize that "the local Indian
communities do have a large and direct stake in [the federal] sentencing
process." 67 If the Commission heard the tribal representative's plea for
recognition of tribal communities in the sentencing process, the
Commission never acted upon that request in any way in issuing the
guidelines.
Another key witness, who was the Federal Public Defender in New
Mexico at the time of her testimony and who regularly defended illegal
alien defendants and Indians, cautioned the Commission against considering
either foreign sentences or tribal court sentences. 68 She raised the fact that
"most of the tribal judges are not lawyers" and that "counsel in tribal courts
62.
63.
cases.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3(a).
In the years 1997-2001, federal judges used upward departures in only .6 to .8% of
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 51,

Figure G (6th ed. 2001).
64. United States Sentencing Commission, Regional Public Hearing, Denver, Colorado,
November 5, 1986, Transcript, 163, 166 (testimony of Donna Chavez, Assistant Attorney
General, Navajo Nation Dep't of Justice).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 173-74.
67. Id. at 169.
68. Id. at 220, 221-26 (foreign sentences) and 226-32, 239-42 (testimony of Federal
Public Defender Tova Indritz).
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is rare" and further recommended that "only counseled convictions should
69
be counted in any event, including convictions in federal and state courts."
The Federal Public Defender also raised general concerns about due process
in tribal courts, including concerns that "quality varies widely from one
tribe to another" and that tribal courts are "poorly funded and have limited
access to training. ' 0
When the guidelines were issued in final form in 1987, the Commission
failed to explain which testimony it credited or why it reached its
conclusion as to tribal courts. As a result of its determination, tribal courts
are now treated exactly like foreign courts under the guidelines. And tribal
and foreign court sentences are treated dramatically differently than state
court sentences.
In sum, when state governments exercise their inherent governmental
powers through criminal prosecutions, the Commission-and thus federal
courts-respect that exercise of power in subsequent federal proceedings.
And, as noted above, 7 ' the guidelines do not ask courts to look behind the
record of those prior offenses to try to determine whether the Texas
sentences were too harsh or the Minnesota sentences were too lenient; the
Commission adopted a model that trusts the judgment of the community
and the court that issued that sentence in the prior adjudication. When tribal
courts and foreign courts exercise the same kinds of power, the Commission
discourages the federal courts from according similar respect to those
actions.
Two questions arise regarding the wisdom of Commission policy with
respect to tribal courts. First, are tribal courts so similar to foreign courts
that they should be treated the same by the Commission? Second, are tribal
courts so dissimilar to state courts that they should be treated differently by
the Commission? These questions are addressed in the next two sections.
B. Comparing Tribal Courts and Foreign Courts
At first glance, treating tribal courts like foreign courts seems
symmetrical and, perhaps, respectful. By treating Indian nations like
foreign nations, one might conclude offhand that the Commission is simply
being respectful of tribal sovereignty and elevating Indian tribes to a status
akin to a foreign nation. The authority of tribal courts, like the authority of
foreign courts, arises from a source of sovereignty that is foreign to the
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 228.
See supra note 54.
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states and the United States. Indeed, the Supreme Court has often noted
that tribal governments and tribal sovereignty pre-existed the United
States.72 However, Chief Justice John Marshall famously held that tribes
are not foreign nations, and are more correctly denominated "domestic
73 but tribes sometimes long to be restored to full
dependent nations,
74
"nationhood.,

With regard to foreign courts, sound reasons exist for taking a cautious
approach toward counting foreign sentences in the federal sentencing
process. There is a wide variance in the operation of foreign courts. While
some foreign courts operate in a fashion similar to American courts, others
may operate far differently and may occupy a far different place in the
Some foreign courts may have
structure of foreign governments.
of
what process is due a criminal
conceptions
dramatically different
defendant. Foreign courts may also have different views of the relative
seriousness of any given offense. 75 Moreover, length of sentence may not
translate to a useful measure of the seriousness of an offense.7 6
For a variety of reasons, all of which are based primarily on the
tremendous diversity of foreign courts, it makes sense to create a
presumption in the guidelines against counting foreign sentences in
computing a defendant's criminal history in federal courts. Because of the
variation in foreign courts, we simply may not be able to trust the results in
72. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (describing Indian tribes
"[a]s separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution"); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384
(1896) (recognizing the Cherokee Nation's powers of government as existing before the U.S.
Constitution); see Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
73. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
74. For some of the arguments in favor, see Steven Paul McSloy, American Indians and
the Constitution:An Argumentfor Nationhood, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 139, 173-74 (1989).
75. Consider an Islamic country, such as Malaysia, that has included punishment such as
death by stoning for a woman's commission of adultery or other countries that reportedly cut off
the hands of a thief See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional
CriminalProcedure in an InternationalContext, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 852-56 (2000) (describing
practice in some Islamic countries of classifying crimes according to the degree to which they
offend Allah). See also United States v. Winson, 793 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1986) (expressing
concern for using foreign convictions as predicates for the offense of felon in possession of a
firearm because it might require recognition of a military tribunal adjudication in Nicaragua as
well as condemnations of political prisoners in Poland).
76. For example, the popular press has recently given a great deal of attention to the
treatment of one of the 9/11 hijacking co-conspirators in German courts; the defendant was
sentenced to the maximum of fifteen years imprisonment under German law for his conviction
on more than 3000 counts of accessory to murder. See Desmond Butler, First Conviction in
9/11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, at Al. For a short description of the German
sentencing regime, see Carol D. Rasnic, Making the Criminal Defendant's Punishment Fit the
Crime: The ContrastBetween German and U.S. Laws of Sentencing, 7 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 62,
69 (1994).
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foreign courts to the same degree that we trust convictions from state and
federal courts. The decision not to count foreign sentences reflects the view
that foreign courts, as a category, are not to be trusted routinely, for all the
reasons just indicated.
Thus, while treating tribal courts like foreign courts may have seemed
sensible at first blush, viewed in this light, treating tribal courts like foreign
courts may reflect something other than respect for tribal sovereignty. It
may reflect suspicion and mistrust of the processes and results of criminal
justice in tribal courts.
In light of the rhetoric of every American president since Richard Nixon
and the increasing respect for tribal courts in various federal laws and
Supreme Court decisions,77 any federal policy that reflects mistrust of the
role and judicial processes of tribal courts on matters clearly within their
jurisdiction seems out of step with the direction of modem federal Indian
law and policy. Thus, consideration must be given as to the differences
between tribal courts and foreign courts.
Tribal courts differ from foreign courts in several respects. To note just
a few, unlike foreign courts, tribal courts have an integral role to play in the
criminal justice regime within the boundaries of the United States.
Offenders travel to and from Indian reservations far more freely and often
than between the United States and foreign nations. It is likely far easier for
federal courts to obtain cooperation, such as obtaining records, from tribal
courts, all of which are located within the continental boundaries of the
United States and are subject to the "superior sovereignty" of the United
States.78
As noted above, the structure of the federal Indian country criminal
justice system reflects a partnership between the federal government and the
various tribal governments as to criminal justice and public safety. If the
United States is viewed as a single large community, the role of tribal courts
is essential to maintenance of public safety and public order in this
community. Foreign courts lack such an important role in the domestic life

77. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text (discussing presidential, congressional,
and Supreme Court support for tribal self-governance and self-determination); see also infra
notes 164-201 and accompanying text (discussing federal and state judicial actions
representative of respect for tribal self-governance and self-determination).
78. See, e.g., In re Long Visitor, 523 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1975) (recognizing right of
federal grand jury to subpoena to tribal members on the reservation in investigation under Major
Crimes Act); United States v. Velarde, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1316-17 (D. N.M. 1999) (trial
subpoena); United States v. Boggs, 493 F. Supp. 1050, 1054 (D. Mont. 1980) (grand jury
subpoena).
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of the United States. 79 Thus, from the viewpoint of federal Indian policy
and in light of the structure of federal criminal justice, tribal courts play a
far different role in the United States than do foreign courts. Given these
tremendous differences, treating them the same is difficult to justify.
While the justification for treating tribal courts in a manner identical to
foreign courts is difficult to understand-it has not been explained or
defended by the Sentencing Commission-such analysis begs the question
of how tribal court sentences ought to be treated. As noted above, just as
the Commission determined that foreign sentences were not to be
considered routinely, the Commission implicitly expressed full confidence
in state court sentences, even those of municipal and juvenile courts.8" One
obvious alternative to treating tribal courts like foreign courts is treating
tribal courts like state courts.
To consider this alternative, we must first consider why the Commission
(and therefore the federal courts) trusted state court sentences enough to use
them in computation of criminal history in the federal sentencing process.
C. Tribal Courts and State Courts
Of the various concerns about foreign courts noted above, perhaps the
most compelling concern is the wide diversity of the processes and values
within the various foreign courts and the lack of any universally accepted
belief about what constitutes a court. One might very well have the same
concern about tribal courts, particularly in light of the fact that more than
562 federally-recognized Indian tribes and native villages exist in the
continental United States and Alaska. 8 1 However, tremendous diversity in
state jurisdictions exists within the United States as well. The fifty states,
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and other jurisdictions, all have
diverse approaches to criminal justice.
While the United States Supreme Court has imposed a great deal of
uniformity on criminal procedure in state courts,8 2 we know as a matter of
79. One could easily argue that the guidelines need not treat all foreign courts identically,
cf United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming a district court's upward
departure based on Canadian convictions without inquiring into the process through which those
convictions were obtained), but that is an argument for another day.
80. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(d) (2002).
81. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 68 Fed. Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003) (listing 562 tribes
recognized and eligible for Bureau of Indian Affairs Services Funding).
82. See Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP.
CT. REV. 65, 67 (1993) ("Federal criminal procedure law has become in effect a detailed,
national Code of Criminal Procedure that almost totally supersedes state law.").
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fact that the criminal justice systems within states remain quite diverse,
even on some relatively important issues. Some states, for example, impose
the death penalty. Others do not. 83 Some states require grand jury
indictments; others do not.8 4 Some states require unanimous verdicts by
juries of twelve persons to obtain conviction. Other states vary from these
requirements. 85 Some states elect their judges. Other states use different
86
types of processes involving appointments or appointments and elections.
Even in the specific area of criminal sentencing, states have adopted a wide
87
range of diverse approaches.
Given the diversity among foreign courts, state courts, and tribal courts,
what then is common to state courts that allows the Commission to trust
those courts, but is lacking in foreign courts? One answer may be the fact
that states and their courts are recognized in the United States Constitution
in, for example, the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 88 This answer begs the
question of why the federal Sentencing Commission trusts state court
criminal sentences. It explains generally that American courts are required
to respect judgments of the various state courts in civil proceedings, but
does not explain why the Commission ought to adopt state court criminal
judgments for federal sentencing purposes. No one would argue that the
federal government is constitutionally required to consider state criminal
records for purposes of federal sentencing. One could easily imagine a
federal sentencing structure that did not rely on prior state criminal records,
but used only federal records. Moreover, this structural answer does not
effectively distinguish state courts from tribal courts which, federal statutes
and common law make clear, are legitimate under federal law.
83. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002) (noting that thirty eight states have
capital punishment).
84. In Hurtado v. California,110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884), the Supreme Court famously held
that the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply to the states. Numerous states
have since declined to use grand juries. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining:
Reassessing the Disincorporation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1457, 1476 (2000)

(noting that "many if not most states" had abandoned the use of grand juries by the midtwentieth century).
85. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 1998 (2000); Robert
H. Miller, Comment, Six of One Is Not a Dozen of the Other: A Reexamination of Williams v.
Florida and the Size of State CriminalJuries, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 629 & n.45 (1998)

(noting that "[m]any states have.. . accepted the Court's invitation to depart from their twelveperson jury standards and unanimity requirements in civil and criminal cases.")
86.

Jeffrey W. Stempel, MalignantDemocracy: Core Fallacies Underlying Election of the

Judiciary, 4 NEV. L.J. 35, 58-59 & n.61 (2003) (briefly summarizing from other sources the
varying state processes for judicial selection).
87. See Reitz, supra, note 1 at 226-27 (noting that approximately twenty state
jurisdictions have adopted guideline sentencing regimes and discussing the differences).
88. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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The more likely explanation as to why the federal government trusts
state court sentences enough to make them an integral part of federal
sentencing is the notion that the state courts share common fundamental
values with the federal courts. The Commission can be confident that the
state courts share such values by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Supreme Court's determination that this amendment incorporates much
of the Bill of Rights into state proceedings. Because state courts must now
meet most of the federal standards of procedural protection found in the
federal Bill of Rights, the Commission can have confidence in the quality of
the convictions reached and sentences meted out in state courts. Under
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Fourteenth Amendment can be viewed as
a federal mandate that the values of state courts may not deviate in certain
material respects from the values of federal courts.
Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights
however did not apply to states. In Barron v. Baltimore,89 decided in 1833,
the Supreme Court explicitly held that the protections found in the Bill of
of Rights applied only to
Rights do not apply to state governments; the Bill
90
government.
federal
the
by
exercises of authority
Following the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted,
requiring states (and their courts) to provide due process and equal
protection and to protect the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States. Although the Fourteenth Amendment did not explicitly
incorporate the Bill of Rights, it has been deemed to incorporate the key
provisions of the Bill of Rights in numerous Supreme Court cases. Indeed,
the extent of that incorporation was years in development and has long been
a matter of controversy, with Justice Black famously arguing in favor of
total incorporation, 91 and Justice Frankfurter famously opposed.9 2
Throughout the debate, the Court has consistently adopted the selective
incorporation approach and it spent several decades in the mid-Twentieth
of Rights
Century gradually incorporating most of the relevant Bill
93
provisions, at least those that are relevant to criminal justice.
The Supreme Court seems to have settled on the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates those portions of the Bill of Rights
that are in some sense "basic in our system of jurisprudence" or represent
89.
90.
91.
92.

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
Id. at250-51.
See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Felix Frankfurter,

Memorandum on "Incorporation"of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the

FourteenthAmendment, 78 HARV. L. REv. 746 (1965).
93. See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
137-230 (1998).
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"fundamental principles of liberty." 94 While not all of the components of
the Bill of Rights apply to state courts, each of the provisions that is
necessary for "fundamental due process" does apply. 95 These protections
are not merely aspirational; they are guaranteed to varying extent by the
federal courts. Not only may a defendant appeal a question of federal
constitutional law by petitioning the United States Supreme Court, a
defendant may also seek the privilege of habeas corpus for unlawful
detention by a state court or even pursue civil actions under Section 1983.
In short, there are myriad reasons why the Sentencing Commission
might trust the accuracy and the fairness of state court sentences. While
this analysis has never been made explicit by the Commission, 96 this
analysis implicitly serves as the basis of the Commission's assumption that
all state sentences may be considered in each defendant's criminal history
analysis. The Commission can have substantial confidence that even
though a state court conducts a trial and renders a sentence under a different
source of inherent sovereignty, state court sentences have been rendered in a
manner substantially similar to the way in which a federal court renders a
sentence, or at least in a manner that does not differ as to any fundamental
issue of due process. Accordingly, the Commission and the federal courts
can trust the accuracy and fairness of the judgment adequately to use it as a
basis of sentencing for a federal crime.
Just as the Supreme Court held in Barron v. Baltimore that the Bill of
Rights does not apply of its own force to state courts, the Supreme Court
has held that the Bill of Rights does not apply of its own force to tribal
courts. 97 However, most of the Bill of Rights protections, which were
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore applied to states
during the last 130 years, have also been applied to tribes in a federal statute
98
enacted in 1968 called the Indian Civil Rights Act.
In addition to the freedoms of speech, assembly and exercise of religion
set forth in the First Amendment, 9 9 the Indian Civil Rights Act incorporated
most of the criminal procedure protections found in the Bill of Rights, such
94.
95.

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
For a critique of the incorporation doctrine in constitutional criminal procedure, see

DONALD A DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE
OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 30-40, 49, 59-62 (2003).

96. The Commission simply assumed that state court sentences would be counted in
criminal history calculations consistent with past practice. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 41

& n.67 (1987).
97. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).

98.
99.

25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2000).
25 U.S.C. § 1302(1).
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as the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements and the proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures,1 00 the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition on double jeopardy,' 01 compelled self-incrimination, 10 2 and
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process,' 0 3 the Sixth
Amendment's rights to notice, a speedy and public trial, the right to
confront witnesses, the right to compulsory process, and the right to
counsel, 10 4 the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions on excessive bail,
excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment 10 5 and even the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement of equal protection. 0 6 In addition, Congress
provided the same remedy for deprivation of rights by tribal courts and
tribal governments that are available against states for a state court's
is, petitioning the courts of the United States for a
deprivation of rights, that
10 7
corpus.
writ of habeas
When the Indian Civil Rights Act was enacted, the Supreme Court had
08
holding that the
not yet rendered its decision in Duncan v. Louisiana,1
right to a jury
Amendment
Sixth
the
incorporated
Fourteenth Amendment
trial. Likewise, the Court had not yet rendered its decision in Benton v.
Maryland,0 9 holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition of double jeopardy which prevents a state from
prosecuting a defendant twice for the same offense. Finally, the Court had
not yet rendered its decision in Schilb v. Kuebel,"0 in which the Court made
explicit its assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessive bail.
The Indian Civil Rights Act was enacted toward the end of the period of
seemingly interminable litigation spawned by the ambiguous language of
The Incorporation Controversy, as this
the Fourteenth Amendment.
litigation is collectively known, reached a crescendo during the Warren
Court era. Thanks to several of the Supreme Court decisions noted above, it
was not long after enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act that state courts
100. § 1302(2).

101. § 1302(3).
102. § 1302(4).
103. § 1302(8).
104. § 1302(6). But see discussion at note 141 infra and accompanying text (noting the
Act's lack of provision for indigent defense counsel).
105. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7).
106. § 1302(8).
107. § 1303; see also Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir.
1996) (stating that federal habeas review extends beyond mere imprisonment to the tribal
punishment of banishment from reservation).
108. 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968).
109. 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969).
110. 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
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were held to all of the same high standards of due process required of tribal
courts. But the timing is noteworthy and it bears emphasis: tribal courts
were required by Congress to provide numerous protections to criminal
defendants while state courts were still arguing in the Supreme Court that
some of these same protections need not be provided.
Currently, the nature of those protections is virtually identical."' While
for states these requirements are constitutional, springing from the
Fourteenth Amendment and its interpretation in Supreme Court decisions,
and for tribes these requirements are by federal statute, springing from the
Indian Civil Rights Act, the end result is that state and tribal courts must
offer virtually identical procedural protections to criminal defendants.
Though tribal courts and state courts traveled different paths, they
reached the same destination; both courts must today provide most of the
protections set forth in the Bill of Rights. As a result, the modus operandi
of tribal courts is not fundamentally different than that of state courts.
Indeed, most tribal judicial systems are structured very much like the state
and federal court systems and state and federal law heavily influence tribal
court procedures. "[S]ome tribal courts operate as nearly exact replicas of
state courts. ' 12 Commentators have occasionally challenged the quality of
tribal courts, 113 but these are the same kinds of criticisms frequently raised
against rural state courts' 14 and it has not been argued that sentences from
such courts should be discounted.
Empirical evidence suggests that tribal courts routinely hear the same
115
kinds of misdemeanor cases that state courts handle. In the Means
decision in 1999, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court reported the range of
criminal cases handled in its lower courts in one recent year. 1 6 The court
noted that more than twenty percent of the cases were adjudications of the
111. Two distinctions in the nature of those protections exist and they will be discussed
below.
112. Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis, One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal
Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 294 (1998). Dean Newton further illustrated her point by
noting that the Oneida tribal court hired two retired judges from New York's highest court to
serve as tribal judges. Id. at 294 n.37; see also Hon. Tom Tso, The Process ofDecision Making

in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 225, 227 (1989); cf Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978) (noting that "some Indian tribal court systems have become
increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many respects their state counterparts").
113. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.

114. Similar criticisms are raised against rural state courts. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett,
Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273, 324 & n.220 (2003) ("rural [state] judges are seen as
intellectually inferior to urban [state] judges"). See generally Theodore Fetter, Improving Court
Operations in RuralAreas, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 255 (1982).

115. Russell Means v. Dist. Court-Chinle Judicial Dist., 26
1999).
116. Id.; see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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offense of driving while intoxicated and more than twenty percent were
adjudications of crimes against persons, such as simple assault.1 17 The court
summarized the criminal work of the lower Navajo courts as "addressing
the serious criminal and social problems of drunk driving, assaults and
batteries (including aggravated assault and battery with deadly weapons),
sex offenses 8 against children, disorderly conduct, and public
1
intoxication." "
Under the federal sentencing guidelines, public intoxication is never
counted, no matter the court of conviction, but these and the other offenses
described by the Navajo court are the same kinds of offenses that likely are
high in state courts with jurisdiction over areas with similar unfortunate
socio-economic profiles. In other words, it is fair to conclude that many
tribal courts and state courts handle the same or similar kinds of cases.
The successful development of tribal courts has been noted widely and
approvingly. In the federal courts, it has been fashionable for nearly half a
century to claim that tribal courts are "improving." In 1959, in a case called
Williams v. Lee, 19 the United States Supreme Court noted improvements in
the Navajo Nation justice system. 20 Since that time, federal courts and
federal judges have often made similar pronouncements. 121
Lest the talk of "improvements" in tribal courts seem condescending,
note that the Supreme Court has worked diligently during the same period
of time to "improve" the quality of justice meted out in state courts. 122
Since the time of the Fourteenth Amendment and the gradual piecemeal
incorporation of the protections of the Bill of Rights, state courts have also
23
improved dramatically during the same period. 1
Despite the putative fairness of state courts, for Native Americans, the
use of state court sentences and not tribal court sentences has produced a
117. Means, 26 INDIAN L. REP. at 6085.
118. Id. at (slip op. 5-6).
119. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
120. Id. at 222 n.9.
121. Justice O'Connor has explained that "tribal courts, while relatively young, are
developing in leaps and bounds." Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third
Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 2 (1997); see also Tribal Justice Act:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. 58 (1995) (statement of Hon.
William Canby, Chair of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Task Force on Tribal Courts) (asserting that
"tribal courts today are infinitely more competent and better staffed than they were thirty or
even fifteen years ago").
122. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
123. As a practical matter, tribal courts and state courts go about the routine work of
"improving" in very similar fashion. For several years tribal judges have been taking basic and
advanced judicial education courses side by side with state court judges at the National Judicial
College in Reno, Nevada.
See National Judicial College website, avalaible at
http://www.judges.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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cruel irony in at least one state with substantial Indian country jurisdiction,
South Dakota. A recent study there suggests that Native Americans who
are prosecuted by state authorities for crimes that occur outside Indian
reservations receive disparate treatment as compared to Whites.124 Among
the findings are that state courts gave Indian defendants sentences that were,
125
on average, approximately two years longer than those given to Whites,
that Indians were denied
bond far more often,1 26 and received fewer
127
suspended sentences.

Thus, for Native American defendants prosecuted in state courts in South
Dakota, the arguments about fairness and trustworthiness of the state courts
may ring hollow. Since the federal sentencing guidelines generally use the
length of sentence in weighing the seriousness of criminal history, 12 8 and
since the sentencing judge does not routinely evaluate the fairness of the
length of the sentence before using it as part of the criminal history
calculation, Indian federal defendants in South Dakota who have state court
criminal records may believe use of the disparate state record is unfair.
They may wish to seek downward departures by arguing that, in the
aggregate, South Dakota state sentences overestimate the seriousness of
their criminal history.
D. The Effect of the Limited Right to Counsel in Tribal Court on
Sentencing Under the Guidelines
Many state courts provide procedural protections greater than the federal
minimum standards.'
Numerous tribal courts also provide protections for
criminal defendants that are greater than federal minimum standards. 3 °
Nevertheless, different federal standards for criminal procedure apply to
states and to tribes. There are two important substantive differences in the
protections applied by tribal courts under the Indian Civil Rights Act and
124. See generally Richard Braunstein & Steve Feimer, South Dakota CriminalJustice: A

Study of Racial Disparities, 48 S.D. L. REv. 171 (2003); see also Elsie Meeks & Frank
Pommersheim, A Review of South Dakota CriminalJustice: A Study of Racial Disparities by
Richard Braunstein and Steve Feimer, 48 S.D. L. REv. 208 (2003) (commenting on the data of
disparate impact between non-Indians and Indians).
125. Braunstein & Feimer, supra note 124, at 180 (noting that Indians received aggregate
sentences that were 832 days longer than those for Whites and actual sentences that were 667
days longer).
126. id. at 177.
127. Id. at 181-82.
128. See supranote 54 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (noting that most states provide a
right to appointed counsel that is more generous than the federal constitutional minimum).
130. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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those applied by state courts because of incorporation of the Sixth
Amendment by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The first key difference in criminal procedural protections is that the
right to a jury trial is much broader in tribal court than in state courts. In
tribal court, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial if he is accused of an
offense that is punishable by any term of imprisonment and, thus, has a
right to a jury trial even for petty offenses.' 31 In contrast, a defendant in
state court has a constitutional right to a jury trial only if he is charged with
a felony or a misdemeanor punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least
six months.' 32 If a jury is viewed as a greater protection for the defendant
from arbitrary prosecutorial power, tribal courts are thus somewhat more
protective of defendants than state courts, at least in the area of petty
offenses.
The second key distinction between state courts and tribal courts,
however, makes it impossible to conclude that tribal courts are always more
protective of defendants. Although Congress included in the Indian Civil
Rights Act a right to counsel to assist in the defense of criminal charges,
Congress pointedly refused to impose on tribal governments the principle
first announced in Johnson v. Zerbst,133 and applied to the states in Gideon
v. Wainwright,134 that such counsel must be provided at government
expense. 135 Accordingly, unlike state courts, tribal courts are under no
federal requirement to provide indigent defense counsel or public defenders
for tribal misdemeanants.
Congress likely declined to apply the Gideon principle to tribal courts for
a couple of reasons. First, Congress was likely attempting to be sensitive to
resource issues of tribal governments. Providing indigent defense counsel
is expensive. On Indian reservations, where poverty runs high, a substantial
number, and perhaps nearly all, of the defendants would require indigent
counsel. When the Indian Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1968, there were
fewer than 25 Indians practicing law in the entire country and none of them
were practicing in Arizona and New Mexico to name a couple states with
vast amounts of Indian country. 136 Requiring defense counsel would have
131. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10).
132. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
133. 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
134. 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963).
135. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (prohibiting tribes from denying "any person in a criminal
proceeding the right ... at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense")
(emphasis added).
136. William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History of
African American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions 1950-2000, 19 HARV.

BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 8-9 (2003).
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not only dramatically increased the costs of public safety at a location
where public safety was already a problem; the absence of available
attorneys might have simply prevented any prosecutions from occurring.
Second, Congress was also likely willing to make such a compromise in
light of the fact that it limited tribal court jurisdiction to misdemeanors and
maximum sentences of six months imprisonment and a $500 fine, limits
that have since been raised. 37 At the time of enactment of the Indian Civil
Rights Act, the United States Supreme Court had not extended the right to
indigent counsel in state courts to misdemeanor proceedings. As in other
cases discussed above, 138 nearly twenty states continued to resist the notion
that counsel needed to be provided to indigent defendants who had not been
charged with felonies. It was not until five years after the Indian Civil
Rights Act, when Argersinger v. Hamlin13 9 was decided in 1972, that the
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to indigent counsel as
applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment (and Gideon) extended
even to petty misdemeanors. As a result, tribal courts were not required to
provide indigent counsel, a provision that was not amended when tribal
jurisdiction was extended from petty misdemeanors to full misdemeanors in
1986. 14
Those concerned with the quality of justice in tribal courts frequently
point to the lack of provision for indigent defense counsel in the Indian
Civil Rights Act. 14 1 While this might be thought a serious flaw by those
concerned with the rights of criminal defendants in tribal courts (and it may
be a serious flaw), there are several reasons that this concern would not
prohibit counting of tribal courts sentences in the federal sentencing
context.
First, circumstances have changed dramatically in Indian country since
1968. A substantial number of tribal governments now exceed the bare
requirements of the Indian Civil Rights Act and provide indigent counsel to
tribal defendants. 142 In some tribal courts, it is a matter of practice. In

137. In 1986, these limits were increased to a maximum of term of imprisonment of one
year and/or a maximum fine of $5000. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99570, Tit. IV, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207 (Oct. 27, 1986). The purpose was nominally to give tribes
more resources to address the traffic of illegal narcotics on Indian reservations.
138. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
139. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
140. See supra note 137.
141. See, e.g., Vincent C. Milani, Note, The Right to Counsel in Native American Tribal
Courts: Tribal Sovereignty and CongressionalControl, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279 (1994); see
also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
142. Milani, supra note 141, at 1297 & n.95 (stating that "many of the more developed
tribal court systems do attempt to provide counsel for criminal defendants").
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others, it is a statutory right provided by the tribal code. 143 As to staffing of

indigent counsel, dozens of tribes have s ecific positions or offices
designated as the "tribal public defender."

IT

Still others have legal aid

offices in which legal aid attorneys also serve as indigent defense
counsel. 145 Some tribes use "advocates," persons who generally do not
have sufficient legal training to sit for a state bar examination, but may be a
member of a tribal bar or otherwise be recognized and trained to represent
tribal defendants in tribal court proceedings. 14 6 Another approach is to

require members of the tribal bar to take such appointments in order to meet

143. See, e.g., Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribe Laws Codified, §§ 1-2-401(1) and
(2), which provide:
Every person appearing as a party before Tribal Court, except as otherwise
provided for proceedings associated with Small Claims, has a right to be
represented by an attorney or other person admitted to practice before the
Court at the person's own expense. (2) An indigent defendant accused of a
criminal offense punishable by imprisonment has a right to representation by
the Tribal Defender's Office.
144. In United States v. Red Bird, 146 F. Supp.2d 993 (D. S.D. 2001), affirmed, 287 F.3d
709, 716 (8th Cir. 2002), a federal judge in South Dakota observed:
The Rosebud Sioux Tribe, obviously determined to protect the rights of its
indigent Rosebud tribal members, had and has a public defenders' office to
provide legal representation at the expense of the tribe. In that sense, the
Rosebud Tribe is unusual in providing an attorney admitted to practice. Most
tribes within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the
District of South Dakota, Central and Northern Divisions, do not provide this
right. Defendants in these other courts are "represented" by an "advocate," a
non-lawyer, and the Court takes judicial notice of that.
This court's observations about the indigent counsel on the reservations within its
jurisdiction in South Dakota probably cannot be generalized to all Indian tribes. The
reservations in South Dakota are among the very poorest in the United States and it is
perhaps surprising that even one of these has chosen to provide indigent defense by
licensed attorneys. In an effort to test this assumption the author hired a research
assistant to test whether other tribes provide indigent counsel. The research assistant
informally contacted over seventy Indian tribes and determined that more than twodozen provide indigent defense by state-licensed attorneys. For many of the others, the
court did not routinely exercise criminal jurisdiction or was not responsive.
145. Id. For example, the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribal Defender's Office was
established in 1993 and has four public defenders, some of whom also handle civil legal aid
matters. The tribe has two prosecutors.
146. The Navajo Nation Bar Association administers a bar examination annually and
currently has over 400 members. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court allows attorneys to
practice before the Navajo courts, but it also allows "tribal court advocates," who lack formal
law school training, to appear in some cases. Advocates must first pass the Navajo Nation bar
examination.
See generally Navajo
Nation
Bar
Association
website
at
http://www.navajolaw.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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their pro bono requirements.147 In summary, tribes use a variety of methods
48
of providing some form of defense counsel for indigent defendants. 1
In the American justice system in general, "quality representation for all
criminal defendants remains more of an aspiration than a reality.' 49 The
statement is likely to be just as true in tribal justice systems. However, for
those tribes that routinely provide attorneys to indigent defendants in tribal
courts, just as their state and federal counterparts do, lack of counsel is not a
legitimate basis for refusing to count their sentences.
Even for tribes that do not provide indigent defense counsel, there is
probably a legal basis for using such sentences if the Commission wished.
For a while, it was thought to be unlawful for a federal court to count such a
sentence in computing a defendant's criminal history. Some might still
argue that federal law prohibits the counting of sentences in cases in which
a defendant lacked counsel. The law currently is not entirely clear on this
point.
In Argersingerv. Hamlin, 150 the Supreme Court first held that defendants
are constitutionally entitled to counsel before being sentenced to any term
15 1
of imprisonment, including for petty misdemeanors. In Scott v. Illinois,
the Court made clear that the right attached only in cases in which
"authorized imprisonment" is imposed. At the time of adoption of the
guidelines, it was widely believed, in accordance with these cases and the
Supreme Court's holding in 1980 in Baldasar v. Illinois, 152 that it was
unconstitutional to consider uncounseled misdemeanor convictions in
sentencing for a subsequent offense. After adoption of the guidelines, the
lower federal courts demonstrated confusion as to whether Baldasar
tribal misdemeanor sentences even
prohibited consideration of uncounseled
53
in the context of upward departures.'
147. Navajo Nation Pro Bono Rules of 1996, Rule III.A.1 (authorizing the Navajo Nation
courts to appoint Navajo Nation Bar Association members as counsel for indigent defendants in
criminal proceedings).
148. One final means of indigent defense worth noting is law school clinical work. Several
law schools have been involved in the past with providing indigent defense in tribal court.
Currently the University of Washington School of Law provides indigent defense on the Tulalip
Indian Reservation through the University's Tribal Court Criminal Defense Clinic. See
http://www.law.washington.edu/clinics/tribal.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
149. Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk of
Disparityfrom Differences in Defense Counsel Under Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV.

435, 436 (2002).
150. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
151. 440 U.S. 367, 382 (1979).
152. See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
153. Compare United States v. Norquay, 987 F.2d 475, 482 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that
Baldasar prohibits using tribal convictions obtained in the absence of counsel as a basis for
enhancing a sentence) and United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 n.17 (9th Cir. 1991)
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In 1994, in Nichols v. United States,1 54 the Supreme Court overruled
Baldasar, and held that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be
considered in computing criminal history for sentencing purposes, but only
if the conviction resulted in no sentence of imprisonment for which counsel
would have been required under the Constitution.' 55 It is not entirely clear
how this principle applies to the use of uncounseled tribal court convictions
resulting in imprisonment because the Court's precise rationale for all of
these cases is somewhat muddled. 56 The early cases suggest that it is
simply unfair to imprison a person based on a conviction in which the
defendant was without counsel. 157 In his concurrence in Baldasar,Justice
Marshall indicated that an uncounseled conviction is "not sufficiently
reliable" to support imprisonment for a subsequent offense. 158
In a more recent case, the Court showcased the confusion about the
159
reason for the rule on uncounseled convictions. In Alabama v. Shelton,'
the Court indicated that the "key Sixth Amendment inquiry" is "whether the
adjudication of guilt corresponding to the prison sentence is sufficiently
reliable,"' 160 but it also noted that the "critical point" in Nichols was that the
right to counsel was absolute in felony cases.' 6 1 In other words, as a
constitutional matter the Supreme Court generally prohibits consideration of
a prior sentence when the prior sentence was uncounseled and resulted in a
sentence of imprisonment. It is unclear whether the Court reaches this
result for the formalistic reason that the sentence thereby is simply "invalid"
or for the substantive reason that the conviction, being uncounseled, is
unreliable.
Though the matter may be subject to some debate, it is probably fair to
conclude that the Court has adopted the former, rather than the latter,
construction. Nichols should probably be read for the proposition that a
(holding the same), with United States v. Claymore, 978 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir. 1992) (using
the defendant's ten prior tribal court convictions as a basis for increasing his criminal history
category by one level).
154. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
155. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that a defendant has no
constitutional right to counsel where no sentence of imprisonment was imposed).
156. The sentencing guidelines offer little guidance or interpretation of the Supreme Court
cases, merely noting in the background section to the definition of "prior sentence" that "[p]rior
sentences, not otherwise excluded, are to be counted in the criminal history score, including
uncounseled misdemeanor sentences where imprisonment was not imposed." U.S.S.G. §
4A1.2, cmt. background (2001).
157. See id.;
see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Both cases are preguidelines cases.
158. 446 U.S. at 227-28.
159. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
160. Id.at 667.
161. Id.at 664.
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sentence resulting in imprisonment may be counted under the guidelines if
it was rendered in a lawful and valid manner.1 62 Under this theory, even
uncounseled tribal court convictions resulting in imprisonment might
lawfully be counted in federal sentencing. 163 The Shelton and Nichols
cases, taken together, would seem to indicate that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is satisfied as long as the defendant is represented by
counsel for the offense for which he is then being sentenced and that the
prior conviction may lawfully be considered as long as it was valid when
issued.
The fact that the Commission has legal authority to consider tribal
sentences that were reached without indigent counsel does not necessarily
mean that doing so is a good policy decision. But that question is a
different one than the question as to whether to count tribal court sentences
in general. The former question will be discussed more below.
Despite the difference in requirements for indigent counsel among tribal
and state courts, a difference that is minimized by the fact that many tribal
courts offer indigent counsel even though it is not required, tribal courts and
state courts share many more similarities than differences. Such is the
effect of the imposition of most of the key provisions of the Bill of Rights.
In light of the practical similarities between the proceedings in tribal courts
and misdemeanor cases in state courts, and the substantial similarity in the
federal minimum due process requirements that apply to each forum, it is
difficult to defend the notion that tribal courts ought to be treated more like
foreign courts than like state courts. Because of the Indian Civil Rights Act
and the Fourteenth Amendment, tribal courts simply have much more in
common with the courts of Arizona or Montana than with foreign courts,
even those of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, which share
common legal roots with American courts.
162. Accord Shelton, 535 U.S. at 664 ("[T]he critical point [in Nichols] was that the
defendant had a recognized right to counsel when adjudicated guilty of the felony offense for
which he was imprisoned."). Note also that, as a class, courts have allowed the counting of
cases in which uncounseled misdemeanors resulted in sentences of imprisonment where a
defendant exercised his right to waive counsel, as long as the waiver was knowing and
intelligent. U.S. v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 377 (6th Cir. 2001).
163. On the other hand, one might read Nichols to say that it is inconsistent with due
process in federal courts to consider sentences of imprisonment in which the defendant was not
represented by counsel, even if the sentence was lawful when rendered. Justice Marshall, for
example, might have said that such sentences are not sufficiently reliable to serve as part of the
basis for a subsequent federal sentence. Under this reading, tribal sentences for uncounseled
convictions likely would not be counted. Although tribal courts differ with state and federal
courts in this limited but important regard, the difference may not be relevant for purposes of
federal sentencing. Under this approach, tribal sentences resulting in imprisonment could
generally be counted, but not if they were uncounseled.
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III. THE BROADER CONTEXT OF THE COMMISSION'S POLICY AND ITS
RAMIFICATIONS FOR FEDFRAL INDIAN POLICY AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
POLICY

A. Placingthe Commission'sApproach to Tribal Courts in a Broader
Context
In the past thirty years, the federal government has proceeded along a
unitary path with respect to Indian tribal governments and their courts.
Every President since Richard Nixon has embraced the notion that Indian
tribal governments should have a far greater role in federal policies
affecting them. 164 The Executive branch and independent agencies have
followed the President's lead. 165 Congress has enacted numerous laws
implementing this philosophy, many of which single out tribal courts for
particular attention. The Supreme Court has independently taken a
complementary approach1 67toward tribal courts' 66 and the lower federal
courts have followed suit.
In summary, most of the key institutions of the federal government have
agreed that federal policymakers should shift decision making to tribal
governments where possible, should give respect to tribal institutions, and
at a minimum, should consult with and seek the guidance of tribal
governments on matters that peculiarly affect Indian people. Over the past
thirty years, this federal policy, which was described originally as a policy
of "Indian self-determination" and more recently as "Indian selfgovernance," has achieved unanimous approval across the three principal
the
branches and even the fourth 168 branch of government. Curiously,
69
approach.1
contrary
a
taken
has
Commission
Sentencing
States
United
164. See supranote 11 and accompanying text.
165. See supranotes 12-13.
166. See supranotes 19-25.
167. See supranote 19-24 and accompanying text.
168. The phrase, used to describe the independent agencies, apparently originates with a
Roosevelt appointee. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative
ProcedureAct Emergesfrom New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1585 & n.116 (1996)
(quoting FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT

iii-v (1937)).
169. The Commission can claim membership in the Third (or Judicial) Branch, but it
probably is more correct to consider it a member of the so-called Fourth Branch. In the
Sentencing Reform Act, the statute that created the Commission, Congress described it as "an
independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)
(2000). While the Commission may be located for administrative purposes within the Third
Branch, the members of the Commission are "independent" in that they serve fixed terms of six
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In one respect, the chief constituency of the Commission is the federal
judiciary. It is, after all, federal judges who apply the guidelines. One way
to evaluate the Commission's policy is to look at the actions of the federal
courts. If the activity of federal judges in using tribal court records as a
basis for upward departure is any guide, many of the judges who apply the
guidelines seem not to share the Commission's lack of respect for tribal
court sentences.
Despite the general rarity of upward departures, 170 federal judges have
often used the existence of a lengthy tribal criminal history to justify an
upward departure in Indian country cases. 171 In each of the cases in which
they have done so, judges have not felt the need to evaluate the processes of
years and are removable by the President only for cause. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 992(a)-(b) (2000).
Many would argue that this makes the Commission an independent commission or, in other
words, a member of the "Fourth Branch" of government. For the analysis herein, it matters not
whether the Commission is a component of the Judicial Branch, the Executive Branch, or is an
independent agency. The highest officials in the Judicial Branch and in the Executive Branch
have adopted federal norms in favor of tribal self-governance. See supra notes, 19-21, 164 and
accompanying text. Most "independent" agencies and commissions that have considered the
matter have also adopted similar policies. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
171. See United States v. Lonjose, 42 Fed. Appx. 177, 178 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming onecategory increase in criminal history based on five prior uncounseled misdemeanor tribal court
convictions and noting that the defendant's tribal court record included at least thirteen prior
uncounseled convictions); United States v. Preacher, 2001 WL 1439861 (9th Cir. 2001)
(affirming one-category increase in criminal history based on ten to fourteen tribal court
convictions); Teeple v. United States, 15 Fed. Appx. 323, 324 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming upward
departure based on tribal court convictions on district court's assertion that of the "hundreds and
hundreds of people [the court] had sentenced over the last 27 years, [defendant had] one of the
most extensive criminal records . . . for anyone 22 years of age"); United States v. Antelope,
2000 WL 967973 **1 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming upward departure in criminal history on the
basis of twenty one tribal court convictions); United States v. Waugh, 207 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th
Cir. 2000) (affirming a two category upward departure on the basis of unspecified number of
tribal court convictions involving frequent "alcohol inspired assaultive behavior"); United
States v. G.L., 143 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming upward departure apparently
based on convictions that included a tribal juvenile adjudication of assault); United States v.
Juvenile PWM, 121 F.3d 382, 384 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing sentencing on other grounds but
noting that the district court apparently properly relied on nine tribal court dispositions as
measures for upward departure); United States v. Drapeau, 110 F.3d 618, 620 (8th Cir. 1997)
(affirming one category upward departure in criminal history on the basis of defendant's four
tribal convictions for assault and battery and one for violence to a police officer); United States
v. Early, 1996 WL 337206 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming upward departure from criminal history
category II to category VI based on conduct underlying eleven tribal court assault charges);
United States v. Burke, 80 F.3d 314, 316 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing sentence on other grounds,
but noting that the defendant had fifteen prior countable convictions and more than forty prior
tribal court convictions); United States v. Claymore, 978 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir. 1992)
(departing upward to criminal history category II based on defendant's ten prior tribal court
convictions).
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the particular tribal courts that produced the sentences. 72 Many of these
decisions come from federal courts in Circuits where federal judges have a
keen awareness of the tribal courts and, presumably, have a sense of the
173
quality of tribal courts and their judges and processes.
Likewise, federal district court judges have not hesitated to use tribal
convictions as predicates for the transfer of juvenile offenders to adult
status. The federal juvenile delinquency statute mandates the transfer of a
juvenile accused of a violent felony if he has been previously found to have
committed an offense that would have been considered a violent felony
offense if the defendant had been an adult at the time it occurred. 174 The
same statute provides for discretionary transfer to adult status if such
transfer is in the interest of justice based on a number of factors, including
the juvenile's prior delinquency record.1 75 Federal courts have routinely
considered tribal juvenile records of violent offenses a sufficient basis for
mandatory transfer. 176 However, because the facts of such cases usually
justify discretionary transfer, appeals courts have not had to reach the
question of whether the tribal convictions are predicates for mandatory
transfers. In any event, federal judges have found the records created by
tribal courts to be trustworthy, even in the context of serious ramifications
for youthful defendants.
Consider a more typical case involving an upward departure based on a
tribal court record. In United States v. Drapeau,177 the defendant was
convicted of "assault resulting in serious bodily injury to a one-year-old
child." 1 78 The prosecution arose when a babysitter notified child protective
services after noticing numerous bruises and injuries on the child's body.
After a jury trial, the defendant, who was the boyfriend of the child's
mother, was convicted. At sentencing the district court departed upward
from criminal history category II to criminal history category III on the
basis of four tribal court convictions for assault and battery and one tribal
court conviction for assault of a tribal police officer. As a result of the
upward departure, Drapeau faced a sentencing range of fifty-seven to
172. See cases cited supra note 171.
173. See supra note 22.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2000).
175. Id.
176. See United States v. Juvenile Male MC, 322 F.3d 482, 485 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2002)
(affirming a juvenile's transfer to adult status in a homicide case and noting but not evaluating
the district court's determination holding that a tribal conviction for aggravated assault was a
predicate offense for a mandatory transfer under the federal statutory scheme); United States v.
Juvenile JG, 139 F.3d 584, 586 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1998).
177. 110 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 1997).
178. Id. at 619.
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seventy-one months, rather than fifty-one to sixty-three months. The
district court judge sentenced the defendant to sixty-three months, a
sentence that the judge could have reached without departing upward. The
Eighth Circuit, with Judge Murphy authoring the opinion,179 affirmed the
conviction, ruling that tribal court convictions are entirely appropriate as a
basis for upward departure. 180
Even state courts and legislatures, though they have long competed with
tribal courts for jurisdiction, 18 1 have begun to embrace the notion that tribal
court dispositions are worthy of reliance in state criminal proceedings and
183
A number of states, including Michigan,
for other purposes. 182
Montana, 18New Mexico, 185 Wisconsin, 186 and Wyoming, 187 allow prior
tribal court convictions to serve as predicate convictions to enhance charges
for subsequent state prosecutions for driving under the influence 1of
93
19 2
Arkansas, 89

alcohol. 1 88

Maryland,

194

Massachusetts,

Idaho, 19 '

Georgia,' 9 °

195

Michigan'

96

and Ohio'

Iowa,

97

Maine,

honor tribal court

179. Judge Murphy is a former Chair of the United States Sentencing Commission.
180. Id. at 619-20.
181. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 222 (1959).
182. The increasing trust among state and tribal courts is attributable to numerous
cooperative endeavors. For several years, tribal judges have been trained side-by-side with state
court judges at the National Judicial College in Reno, Nevada. See supra note 123.
183. People v. Wemigwans, No. 239736, 2003 WL 734257, **2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
184. State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1244-45 (Mont. 2003).
185. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102(M) (Michie 2000).
186. State v. Schuman, 520 N.W.2d 107, 108-09 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (applying a state
statute allowing use of tribal court convictions), rev. denied, 524 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. 1994).
187. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-233 (Michie 2003).
188. It should be noted, however, that states are not necessarily consistent in their faith in
tribal court convictions and sentences. For example, though Michigan allows them to serve as
predicate sentences for driving under the influence cases, Michigan does not necessarily use
past tribal court sentences in counting a defendant's criminal history for purposes of sentencing
guidelines for the broad panoply of criminal offenses. See Hon. Michael F. Cavanagh,
Michigan's Story: State and Tribal Courts Try to Do the Right Thing, 76 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 709 (1999). In this article by a Michigan Supreme Court justice, the jurist noted, with
apparent chagrin, that the 1998 Michigan legislature enacted sentencing guidelines that counted
state and federal sentences for purposes of scoring criminal history but omitted sentences from
tribal courts. Id. at 715.
189. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-903(12)(A)(iii) (Michie 2002).
190. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(A)(7) (Harrison 2002).
191. IDAHO CODE § 18-8303(18) (Michie 2002).
192. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2 (West 2002).
193. James A. Billings & Crystal L. Bulges, Comment, Maine's Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act: Wise or Wicked?, 52 ME. L. REV. 175, 198, 203 (2000).
194. MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11 -701(b)(4) (2002).
195. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, §178C (West 2002).
196. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.722(a)(i) (West 2002).
197. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01(D)(1)(f) (West 2002).
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sentences for purposes of requiring registration in their sex offender
registries. And other states rely on tribal convictions in a variety of other
contexts, such as treating them as predicate offenses for enhancement of
sentences in domestic violence prosecutions, 198 serving as a predicate for
suspension or revocation of a driver's license, 199 finding probation
violations 2°° and even computing criminal history for sentencing
20
1 In sum, in a number of matters of great importance, state
purposes. 2°
legislatures and courts are willing to show trust toward tribal courts.
Overall, the Commission's position toward tribal courts seems contrary
to federal Indian policy as applied by the Supreme Court, Congress, the
Executive branch and many of the independent federal agencies. Even
putting aside federal Indian policy, in light of the fact that numerous state
legislatures and courts are beginning to credit tribal courts criminal
convictions for various important purposes, the Commission's position on
tribal courts seems anachronistic even from a criminal justice perspective.
Simply being out of step with the vast majority of other policy-making
governmental entities within the United States, standing alone, is perhaps
not necessarily a reason to change the policy. To determine whether the
guidelines should be amended, one should consider the justifications of the
existing policy, and the ramifications of the existing policy on the
communities that it affects most. The next two sections address these
issues.
B. Justificationsfor CurrentFederalSentencing Policy and Tribal Courts
As noted above, it is not clear why the Commission adopted the position
it did as to tribal courts.20 2 It is apparent, however, that the current
sentencing scheme is difficult to square with federal sentencing policy. The
federal sentencing guidelines ostensibly were created to reduce disparity in
federal sentencing 20 3 and to insure that each defendant is sentenced with due
198. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601.01 (West 2002).
199. Such states include New Mexico, North Dakota, and Washington. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 66-8-102(M); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-27 (2000); Wheeler v. State Dep't of
Licensing, 936 P.2d 17, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
200. State v. Tesheep, 838 P.2d 888, 890 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992).
201. Kansas, for example, does so in its burglary statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4711(e)
(2001).
202. See discussion supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
203. Sentencing guidelines came about largely due to the work of a federal judge, Marvin
Frankel, who lambasted the discretionary system for producing unfair sentences and argued for
a determinate system of sentencing. MARvIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
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regard to his culpability, as measured by the current offense and previous
offenses. 204 The current policy simply fails to meet the goals of accuracy
and fairness that are among the stated bases for having sentencing
guidelines. Absent an upward departure by the court, which is a relatively
unusual action,205 a defendant with a lengthy tribal criminal history who
lacks any state or federal convictions will be routinely treated as a first-time
offender by the federal courts. This means that, on average, an Indian
defendant receives a shorter sentence than his criminal history score might
otherwise justify. This creates a disparity between defendants who are
otherwise similarly situated.
Most federally prosecuted Indian offenses are serious violent offenses,
such as murder, rape, or aggravated assault, that likely carry lengthy
sentences. 2 06 Because federal sentences are already widely perceived to be
unduly lengthy, 20 7 and because it is unlikely that violent Indian offenders
are walking away from federal courts with anything but fairly substantial
federal sentences, one probably need
not be concerned that sentences are
20 8
too short under the current policy.

Nevertheless, the accuracy of the federal sentences under the current
scheme is highly suspect. Under current Commission policy, in the average
case, a defendant with a lengthy tribal criminal history will be sentenced in
the same manner as a first time offender, unless the court takes the
extraordinary step of an upward departure. 20 9 For example, if an eighteenyear-old neophyte participates in an offense with a thirty-five-year-old
204. The Sentencing Reform Act directed the Sentencing Commission "to establish
sentencing policies and practices that serve the goals of sentencing, provide certainty and
fairness, and avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants." Diana E. Murphy,
Inside the United States Sentencing Commission: Federal Sentencing Policy in 2001 and
Beyond, 87 IOWA L. REv. 359, 362 (2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2), (d)-(f) (1994)).
205. See supra note 63.
206. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Using the Arizona United States
Attorney's Office figures for the Navajo Reservation, over eighty percent of the federal
prosecutions were for serious violent felonies. Id. On all the Indian reservations within Arizona
combined, the United States Attorney's Office prosecuted approximately 1072 felony offenses
in 2003. United States Attorney, District of Arizona, Indian Country Report 2001, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/reports/2003rpt/crimp.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2004). More than
400 of those were homicides or serious sex offenses. Id.
207. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
208. On the other hand, if sentences for criminal defendants are too lengthy, policymakers
should address that problem directly and not gratuitously insult tribal courts by underestimating
criminal history by ignoring tribal convictions.
209. As suggested in note 63, upward departures are exceedingly rare as a statistical matter.
A common justification for upward departures in Indian country cases, however, is the fact that
the defendant's criminal history score fails to reflect the seriousness of that defendant's criminal
history. See supranote 171 and accompanying text.
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hardened offender with a lengthy adjudicated history of tribal offenses, and
if they are prosecuted federally for the same offense, the eighteen-year-old
likely will receive the same sentence as the repeat offender. This outcome
hardly seems fair from the standpoint of the younger offender and it hardly
seems consistent with Marvin Frankel's vision of a sentencing regime that
treats similarly-situated individuals similarly.
This outcome is also difficult to square with the Sentencing
Commission's own sentencing principles. In drafting the guidelines, the
Commission declined to adopt a single overarching theory of the purpose of
Rather it drew upon theories of "just dessert" as well 2as
sentencing.
11
of deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation.
theories
utilitarian
According to the Commission's "just dessert" rationale for using criminal
history as a key basis of sentencing, "[a] defendant with a record of prior
criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus deserving
of greater punishment." 2 12 Such a justification is impossible to rationalize
with failure to use tribal court sentences. Similarly, the Commission has
justified the use of criminal history by explaining that one of the best
predictors of future criminal conduct is past criminal conduct. 2 13 Ithas
argued, therefore, that use of criminal history is an important means of
crime control through incapacitation of likely future offenders.2 14 If the
"just dessert" theory, or any of the utilitarian theories, are accurate, the high
crime rate involving Indians would seem to justify the use of these theories
in the context of tribal criminal records. Thus, in myriad ways, the
Commission's policy on tribal courts is impossible to square with its own
rhetoric concerning the goals of sentencing.

210. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 41-43 (Jun. 18, 1987).
211. See, e.g., Aaron Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical
Premisesof the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,52 EMORY L.J. 557, 566-71 (2003); see also Paul J.
Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy
of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 19, 51-53 (2003).
212. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, Criminal
History, pt. A, introductory cmt. The Commission also noted other purposes that are difficult to
square with the failure to count tribal court sentences. For example, "[G]eneral deterrence of
criminal conduct indicates that a clear message be sent to society that repeated criminal
behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence." Id.
213. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 210, at 42.
214. Id.
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C. Ramifications of the Commission's Tribal Courts Policy on Tribal
GovernmentalInstitutionsand Tribal Communities
The Commission's existing policy on tribal courts seems to have two
serious negative ramifications. One is related to the tribal courts and tribal
institutions; the other is related to the tribal community.
Under the current structure of Indian country criminal justice, which
makes tribal courts and federal courts partners in the provision of criminal
justice within Indian communities, the Commission policy suggests that the
federal courts and the tribal courts are not equal partners. The current
guidelines approach means, in essence, that the courts of the United States
should not routinely grant comity to tribal courts and indeed, should ignore
the lawful work of the tribal courts. In addition to the demoralizing
message it sends to the tribal courts, it undermines the authority of the tribal
courts within tribal communities. The Commission's policy contains a
message that can be characterized at best as paternalistic and demeaning:
"tribal courts may be lawful but they are not relevant in federal Indian
country criminal justice." At worst, the implication of the guidelines is that
tribal courts lack legitimacy.
Such a message from the Commission is at odds with the repeated
conclusions of Congress that tribal courts are legitimate and important
institutions. In these times of pervasive federal initiatives in favor of tribal
self-government, the problem identified in the federal sentencing guidelines
extends in some measure beyond sentencing to the whole structure of Indian
country criminal justice.21 5
The current federal criminal justice regime paternalistically informs
tribes that felony offenses within Indian reservations are not matters for
tribal governments. Though this approach seems difficult to defend in this
post-modern era of Indian law, it can perhaps be supported best on the
theory that tribal governments lack the resources to provide adequately for
criminal justice and, thus, need the assistance of the federal government.
Ironically, the problem presented by the guidelines is most acute when
an offender has already been a burden at the tribal level and the tribal courts
have attempted to address the problem. In exercising jurisdiction in cases
arising in Indian country, the federal court stands in the place of a tribal
court that would theoretically otherwise possess felony jurisdiction to
address the serious justice and public safety issues raised by criminal
prosecutions.
On the theory that the federal criminal justice system in Indian country is
justified on the basis of superior federal resources, the involvement of
215. This is an issue that the author will take up in a future article.
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federal authorities is perhaps most defensible when a federal court is
sentencing a defendant who is a repeat offender and has been recognized as
such by a tribal court. In those circumstances, the federal court, in effect, is
serving a supporting role to the tribal community that, by itself, has been
unsuccessful in handling the troublesome offender. Thus, it is particularly
ironic that the federal court would ignore the work of the tribal court as to
such defendants. Indeed, a defendant with a lengthy tribal criminal history
is, by definition, a person who has been a burden to the tribal community,
tribal public safety officials and even the tribal courts. It is exactly such
Indian defendants whom the United States has the greatest moral authority
to prosecute.
The Commission's policy of ignoring the hard work of the tribal courts is
surely most painful in those cases in which tribal courts have been most
involved. If the justification for federal involvement is the superior federal
resources, then the federal courts should credit the work that tribal courts
have done with regard to the same defendant. As noted, individual federal
judges have done so on numerous occasions. 2 16 Because of the lack of
clarity, though, judges have sometimes engaged in contortions to credit
217
tribal court sentences.

Aside from this serious institutional problem with the guidelines, a
practical one has also arisen. During the 1990s, while the national crime
rate fell dramatically across the country, the violent crime rate involving
Indians continually increased. A Native American is two-and-a-half times
more likely than a member of the general population to be a victim of a
violent crime218 and twice as likely to be victimized than an African
American.219 "American Indian women are victims of violent crime nearly
50% more than black males, who are commonly considered the most
victimized class of U.S. citizens.' 220 The rural crime rate for Indians is

216. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
217. See United States v. Thin Elk, 321 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2003) (ostensibly departing
upward on the basis of the victim's "extreme psychological injury," but noting the defendant's
extensive tribal criminal history and increasing the sentence using the horizontal criminal
history axis rather than the vertical axis of seriousness of offense); see also United States v. Fast
Horse, 57 Fed. Appx. 739 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's reliance on past conduct as
reflected in tribal court convictions for an upward departure, though explicitly declining to base
upward departure on tribal court convictions).
218. See, e.g., Margaret Zack, State-Federal Project Fights Reservation Violent Crime,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 30, 2002, at 2B.
219. GREENFIELD & SMITH, supra note 42, at v; see also Hearing,supra note 42, at 10.
220. Braunstein & Feimer, supra note 124, at 173, citing GREENFIELD & SMITH, supra note
42, at vi.
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twice as high as for Whites.22 ' Crime on Indian reservations is becoming a
serious public safety problem as evidenced by the surprising level of
support recently expressed on the Navajo Reservation for the federal death
222
penalty following a string of serious homicide cases.
If the Sentencing Commission's determination to use criminal history in
sentencing is believed to further goals of crime control through greater
incapacitation of recidivists, then there is no place that needs such control
more than Indian reservations.
IV.

HARMONIZING FEDERAL SENTENCING WITH CURRENT NATIONAL
POLICIES FAVORING TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE: CREATING RESPECT FOR
TRIBAL COURTS IN THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

While this article is critical of current Commission policy, the
Commission itself has expressed the notion that the guidelines constitute a
living document. 223 It has recognized that the guidelines may very well
need to be revised periodically. 224 It has also recently taken laudable steps
o
225
In light of
to consider the impact of the guidelines on Native Americans.
the fact that the guidelines can and should evolve, what steps might be
221. Most of the data combine numbers from urban and rural settings, which is not as
useful for analyzing effects on Indian reservations, which tend not to be urban. Nevertheless,
the figures for rural areas indicate that there is a serious public safety problem even in Indian
reservations with federal jurisdiction. The figures have come to light because several Indian
reservations under federal jurisdiction have suffered multiple homicides in recent years. See
Zack, supra note 218 (noting that five homicides occurred in a ten-month period among the
5000 residents of the Red Lake Chippewa Reservation in Northern Minnesota); see also infra
note 222.
222. See Jim Maniaci, Hearing Set for Navajo Stand on Death Penalty, GALLUP INDEP.
http://www.gallupindependent.com/09-10at
available
edition)
(web
03navajostandondeath.html, Sept. 10, 2003; Dennis Wagner, Killer Gets Death in Navajo
Carjack Case, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 21, 2003, at B8; Mark Shaffer, Trial Nears Endfor Mom
Accused of Killing Three Kids, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 16, 2003, at B5.
223. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3925
(1987) (noting that the Commission sees its task as ongoing and it will continually gather and
analyze data).
224. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lA5, policy statement (providing that
"[t]he Commission is a permanent body that can amend the guidelines each year. Although the
data available to it, like all data, are imperfect, experience with the guidelines will lead to
additional information and provide a firm empirical basis for consideration of revisions").
225. In 2002, the Commission convened an advisory group on Native American sentencing

issues. U.S.

SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP (Nov.

4, 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/NAAG/NativeAmer.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004);
see also Transcript of Public Hearing, United States Sentencing Commission, Native American
Advisory Group (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/NAAG/NAAGhear.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2004). The author served on this advisory group.
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taken to hasten their evolution in a manner consistent with modem federal
Indian policy?
One obvious solution is simply to eliminate the section of the guidelines
that indicates, "[s]entences resulting from tribal court sentences are not
counted" 22 6 and simply to change the default rule to one of routine
consideration of tribal court sentences like state sentences. By making the
criminal history for any individual defendant more accurate, such a solution
would further the stated purposes of federal sentencing that, as highlighted
above, 227 are not being met. It would also address the current policy's
apparent lack of respect for tribal courts, harmonizing sentencing policy
with congressional initiatives and Supreme Court decisions evincing respect
for tribal courts.
However, if the purpose of reform is to adopt a policy more consistent
with federal policies in favor of tribal self-govemance, the proper approach
might be less definitive. While the guidelines should certainly be modified
to create a default rule that tribal sentences will be considered with the same
level of respect that the Commission accords to state courts, it might be
considered inconsistent with current federal policy to adopt a unilateral
directive from the federal government to the tribal governments telling them
how their sentences will be used in federal courts. The most fundamental
principle of tribal self-government is that it is each tribal government's right
to choose the public policies that best serve its own governmental purposes.
Under this principle, and consistent with the current notions of the
United States' govemment-to-government relationship with Indian tribes,
the better approach to the treatment of tribal court sentences is to give
individual tribal governments the ultimate power to determine whether their
tribal court sentences should be used in subsequent federal sentencing
proceedings. In other words, the Commission should modify the guidelines
to create a default rule of respect for tribal court sentences, but tribes should
have the right to "opt out" of the scheme by indicating that their sentences
should not be considered in federal sentencing. This opportunity to opt out
would serve federal Indian policy goals of making the tribe the ultimate
decision-maker; it would ensure that tribal courts receive proper respect in
228
the absence of a tribal decision to exclude them from consideration.
226. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2(i).
227. See supra notes 210-214 and accompanying text.
228. Of course, under any sentencing regime that requires tribal court documents, tribal
governments and their courts may also retain an informal measure of control related to the level
of cooperation with federal probation officers who prepare sentencing reports. Federal courts
may rely on sentences from other jurisdictions only if they are supported by reliable
information. Cf U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (2003). As the custodians of these documents, tribes may
well have the ability to control their release.
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Admittedly, this "tribal option" approach is not entirely consistent with
the sentencing policy argument that failure to count tribal criminal history

produces inaccuracy in sentencing. Indeed, it is difficult to square with
either a utilitarian (or deterrence or incapacitation) rationale or the "just
desert" rationale for counting tribal sentences in criminal history. Those
arguments would presumably suggest a hard and fast rule rather than a mere
default rule.

However, sacrificing the underlying sentencing principles to some
degree is necessary to account for tribal sovereignty and tribal selfgovernance. 22 9 Reasonable accommodations for tribal sovereignty and
tribal self-governance should trump sentencing policy, particularly when the
case is federal, only because it arises in Indian country and Indian

defendants are being sentenced. The tribal governmental interest in such
cases is clear and it is powerful. Some tribal justice systems may not share
the same goals as the federal sentencing regime and may well wish to opt
out of participation in the federal sentencing system. Consistent with its
stated commitment to self-determination, the United States should accord
respect to such decisions of tribal governments.
The approach outlined here elevates the general principles of tribal selfgovernance and self-determination above the narrow and particular needs of

sentencing policy, but moves sentencing policy in a direction more
consistent with the federal sentencing regime's rational search for objective
information about criminal history. Thus, such an approach will improve
the accuracy of sentences when tribal convictions are counted.2 30
Such a "tribal option" approach has been used by Congress, in similar
form, in other instances in the federal criminal justice system. Examples
include provisions regarding the imposition of the death penalty for
offenses on Indian lands, 23 ' the federal "three strikes law" for crimes arising
229. This approach also might help to avoid perverse consequences. Tribes that view
current federal sentences as draconian might otherwise be tempted to nullify valid tribal charges
or to use procedures that are constitutionally infirm to prevent tribal sentences from being used
by federal authorities in later federal proceedings.
230. A debate is raging as to the wisdom of further reducing the sentencing discretion of
federal judges, an area in which Congress has been active lately. See Prosecutorial Remedies
and Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat.
650 (2003). While this Article does not take the position that judicial discretion should be
narrowed in general, it does take the position that whatever level of deference applies to state
court sentences should apply in like manner to tribal court sentences, unless tribal governments
determine otherwise. There is simply no rational justification for the Commission to treat tribal
courts and state courts differently.
231. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
Title VI, § 60002(a), 108 Stat. 1968 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3598) (2000). This law
provides that the federal death penalty will apply to crimes arising under the federal Indian
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in Indian country,2 3 2 and the provision lowering the age at which a juvenile
can be treated as an adult from age fifteen to age thirteen.2 3 3
One potential objection to the "tribal option" approach is that, on its face,
it seems to give tribal governments greater control over federal
consideration of tribal sentences than states have over federal consideration
of state sentences-the sentencing guidelines do not allow states to opt not
to allow the federal courts to consider state misdemeanor sentences for
subsequent federal sentencing.

For several reasons, however, this objection is not well-founded. First,
tribal governments have a fundamentally different relationship with the
United States than state governments have. While substantial constitutional
limits on federal criminal prosecutorial power prevent the federal
government from displacing state governments for purposes of routine
felony prosecutions, 2 34 Congress has unilaterally and explicitly authorized
the exercise of power on Indian reservations 235 that it could never exercise
outside federal reservations.
Thus, the federal government, with the
blessing of the Supreme Court, has unilaterally displaced tribal
governments that might otherwise have wished to exercise such power.
And it has unilaterally limited the criminal justice authority of tribal
governments to misdemeanors. 236 Thus, in some sense, the United States is
standing in the tribe's shoes when it prosecutes on the reservation. Given
country criminal statutes only if the Indian tribe with misdemeanor criminal jurisdiction opts to
allow the capital sentences. In arguing for this provision on the Senate floor when it was first
introduced in a previous Congress, Senator Daniel Inouye, co-chairman of the Senate Indian
Affairs Committee, indicated that this provision "accords to tribal governments a status similar
to that of state governments, namely that tribal governments, like state governments, can elect
whether or not to have the death penalty apply for crimes committed within the scope of their
jurisdiction." 137 CONG. REC. 15,982-83 (daily ed. June 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Inouye).
232. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Title VII, § 70001,
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(6)) (providing for mandatory life imprisonment for persons
convicted of their third serious violent felony or drug offense, but providing each tribe with
criminal jurisdiction the option as to whether the provision will apply to Indian country offenses
occurring within the tribe's jurisdiction).
233. See id. at Title XIV, § 140001, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Federal law
generally provides that a juvenile at least fifteen years old may be treated as an adult under the
federal criminal laws under certain circumstances. This section of the 1994 amendments
provides that a juvenile thirteen years old may be treated as an adult if he commits particular
crimes of violence or possesses a firearm during the commission of an offense. The tribal
option provision allows the relevant tribal government to determine whether the juveniles can
be transferred at age thirteen or whether the age fifteen serves as the absolute floor for federal
juvenile transfers for cases arising in Indian country.
234. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995).
235. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
236. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (2000).
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the unilateral nature of this federal action, tribes ought to have some power
to moderate how much they wish to participate in a system that was, after
all, forced upon them.
States, in contrast to tribes, are directly represented in Congress. To a far
greater degree, states have voluntarily consented to the guidelines regime,
and can make their voice heard if they wish to change the manner in which
state sentences are used in criminal history calculations. While it would be
possible to limit the recommendations herein to sentencing in federal cases
arising in Indian country, such limitations are by no means necessary.
Tribal governments, like some of the states, pre-existed the United
whereas the states joined together voluntarily to create the
States. 237 Yet, whra
United States and its various instrumentalities, such as, ultimately, the
Sentencing Commission, the tribes were not part of that compact. Given
that the current official federal policy toward tribes embodies a notion of
tribal self-governance, it is entirely appropriate for the Commission to adopt
an approach that is respectful of tribal prerogatives, even if the approach is
slightly different than the approach it takes toward states. Precedent for
such action is well-established; Congress recognized that tribes ought to be
treated differently than states in 1994 when it created a tribal option as to
the federal death penalty, but offered no such option to the large minority of
states that have refused to authorize the death penalty in their state criminal
justice systems.238
As for the legitimate concern about the lack of a federal requirement for
provision of indigent defense counsel in tribal courts, the Commission
might indicate that it will consider only those tribal convictions and
sentences resulting in imprisonment in which a defendant had been
represented by counsel. Such a determination is not required under federal
law. 239 Nevertheless, given the importance of the institutional role of
defense counsel in the American criminal justice system, it would be
perfectly justifiable for the Commission to make a normative conclusion
that federal judges should not rely upon sentences of imprisonment that
were rendered without counsel. While such an approach might have the
practical indirect effect of broadening the requirement on tribes to provide
indigent counsel, it would do so only for those tribes wishing to have their
tribal court sentences counted in federal sentencing, making it a purely
tribal decision. Such an approach would address the issue in a manner that
is not disrespectful to tribal courts.

237. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 231 and sources therein setting forth debate on such questions.
239. See supra notes 150-156 and accompanying text.
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Such a caveat would provide a meaningful justification for picking and
choosing between tribal sentences without gratuitously offending tribal
courts merely because of their status as tribal courts. Indeed, if concern
about the lack of indigent counsel in tribal courts is the principal objection
to use of tribal court convictions and sentences in federal sentencing, such
an approach would effectively and thoroughly address this concern.
Moreover, such an approach would be easy to administer. As the Supreme
Court has noted, "failure to appoint counsel ...will generally appear from
24
r
the judgment roll itself, or from an accompanying minute order."
For those who continue to be concerned about the quality of justice in
tribal courts, counting tribal court sentences would create additional
scrutiny of those sentences by attorneys representing defendants in
subsequent federal proceedings. It would create a strong incentive for
defense counsel to evaluate the tribal court processes. Such scrutiny would
likely heighten the care taken by tribal courts, particularly when
adjudicating offenses by recidivists.
CONCLUSION
Congress has imposed many of the burdensome strictures of the Bill of
Rights on tribal courts just as the American people (and the Supreme Court)
have, through the Fourteenth Amendment, imposed the same burdens on the
state courts. For tribal courts, which serve tribal communities with cultures
and traditions that are different than those of the states and the federal
government, the imposition of the Bill of Rights has taken a toll on tribal
cultural integrity. 24 1 Within the narrow and carefully circumscribed areas in
which they exercise jurisdiction under federal law, tribal courts now have
an obligation to their communities to mete out justice in a manner
consistent with their own community traditions and values, but also a
manner that is consistent with the federal requirements of due process as
defined in the Indian Civil Rights Act.
While Indian tribes may not necessarily be pleased with this intrusion on
their traditional and customary practices, they have endured this imposition
for thirty-five years. Perhaps for this reason, tribal courts have gained,
more and more in recent years, the trust of Congress and the Supreme
240. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 496 (1994).
241. See Robert Laurence, The Convergence of Cross-Boundary Enforcement Theories in
American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile Full Faith and Credit, Comity and Asymmetry,
18 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 115, 130 (1998) (calling the Indian Civil Rights Act "an imposition on
tribal ways of dominant society's notions of the proper method of governing").
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Court. In shouldering the heavy burdens of providing American-style
procedural protections, tribal courts may have had to turn their backs, to
some degree, on tribal cultural values, but one might say that they therefore
have paid the heavy price of admission to the elite club of American judicial
legitimacy.
Though the tribal courts have paid the same heavy price that states have
paid (and indeed these costs may have seemed even higher from the
standpoint of tribal cultural integrity), the Sentencing Commission has
nevertheless barred them from admission. If a federal agency is unwilling
to recognize the legitimacy of tribal courts when they behave in accordance
with federal legal restrictions and in a fashion much like state and federal
courts, perhaps tribal courts should be freed of the heavy imposition on
cultural integrity that comes with the Indian Civil Rights Act. Since federal
agencies lack the power to free tribal courts from the strictures of the Indian
Civil Rights Act, federal agencies should recognize, as most do, what is
implicit in the Indian Civil Rights Act: tribal courts that behave in
accordance with this law are deserving of respect.
The United States Sentencing Commission stands as perhaps the only
important federal governmental agency with official policies that continue
to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the tribal courts. The Commission should
change its tribal courts policy and recognize that the sentences of tribal
courts are entitled to the same respect as state courts sentences in the federal
sentencing regime.
In keeping with the analysis herein, the Commission should first abolish
Section 4A1.2(i), which prevents tribal court sentences from being used in
the routine calculation of criminal histories. This action would create a
default rule in respect of tribal court sentences. Second, consistent with
federal policies in favor of tribal self-governance, the Commission should
give tribes the option of changing the default rule by declining to cooperate
in federal sentencing.

